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Refundable credits, particularly the earned income tax credit (EITC)
and the child tax credit, serve an important anti-poverty measure for lowincome taxpayers. Annually, millions of taxpayers who do not owe any
federal income tax must file a tax return in order to claim these credits that
are in the nature of social benefits. The eligibility requirements for
refundable credits are complex, and these returns are particularly prone to
audit: EITC audits comprise one-third of all individual income tax audits.
Because of the large dollar amounts at stake, a taxpayer’s mistaken
understanding of the eligibility requirements for these refundable credits
can often result in a deficiency of several thousand dollars. Though studies
indicate that taxpayer error is more commonly inadvertent than intentional,
the section 6662 20% accuracy-related penalty applies once the deficiency
reaches a statutory “understatement” threshold; it is imposed
computationally and without regard to the taxpayer’s intent.
By statute, taxpayers have the right to contest the accuracy-related
penalty by demonstrating that there was reasonable cause for the
underlying error and the taxpayer acted in good faith. Treasury regulations
provide that such a circumstance might include “an honest
misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all the facts
and circumstances, including the experience, knowledge, and education of
the taxpayer.” Yet for all of these reasons—lack of experience, lack of
knowledge, and relative lack of education—the taxpayer is unlikely to have
the knowledge or resources to raise the very defense that is meant to
protect an unsophisticated taxpayer.
Drawing comparisons between refundable tax credits and social
programs administered by other agencies, this article calls upon the IRS to
better differentiate between inadvertent error (“those who don’t know”)
and intentional or fraudulent error (“those who know better”). The article
argues that the current accuracy-related penalty approach is unduly
punitive. It concludes by proposing solutions that the IRS might consider in
light of Congress’s desire for the Service to administer these social benefits
through the Internal Revenue Code.
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INTRODUCTION
Over four million words long and seeming to change unendingly,1 the
Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) has become a complex labyrinth devoid of
any coherent meaning to the average individual taxpayer. Once primarily a
mechanism to raise revenue, the Code is now also used by Congress to
administer social programs and deliver economic incentives. These benefits
come in a variety of forms, with the refundable credit serving as a primary
tool in recent years.
A refundable credit first offsets any liability due; if the credit exceeds
the taxpayer’s liability, it results in a net payment to the taxpayer (hence the
term “refundable”).2 The full cost of a refundable credit to the government
is the sum of the reduction in revenue plus the outlay to the taxpayer. As a
result of the congressional trend toward using the Code to administer social
programs via new refundable credits, the total costs of these credits
(calculated as reduction in revenue plus outlays) has soared in the last
decade, peaking in tax year 2008 at $238 billion.3 As new credits have been
introduced, dollars are not the only thing to have increased—statutory
complexity has also increased.4 At the same time, with so much money at
stake, unscrupulous activity has followed. There are numerous instances of
individuals and of return preparers who have been criminally convicted for
filing fraudulent returns claiming refundable credits.5
Nina Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate, connects the dots
between refundable credits, complexity, and accuracy in an article in which
she discusses the need to regulate the tax return preparer industry. After
noting that “Congress has enacted numerous refundable tax credits, in lieu
of direct spending programs, as a way of delivering social and economic

1

1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at v (2012) [hereinafter
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT].
2

Part I, infra, provides a more nuanced definition of refundable credit.

3

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS 1 (2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/RefundableTaxCredits_One-Col.pdf [hereinafter CBO REPORT].
4

Part I, section B, infra, provides examples and statistics of this complexity.

5

Part III, section A, infra, highlights examples of such schemes.
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benefits to taxpayers,”6 Olson comments that: “The complexity of
eligibility requirements and the application process discourages taxpayers
from preparing their own returns. Taxpayers who are the beneficiaries of
these [refundable] credits are often the least educated and least financially
sophisticated in the United States today.”7
The Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) is in the unenviable position
of enforcing a complex regime that pays out billions of dollars a year. To be
sure, the majority of taxpayers correctly report and receive the refundable
credits to which they are entitled; this article refers to these taxpayers as
“those who know” because they understand the law or rely on a tax return
preparer who prepares their claim correctly. On the other hand, refundable
credit overclaims can be divided into two primary classifications:
1) inadvertent overclaims made by “those who don’t know,” either because
they are unsophisticated and misunderstand the law or because they are
preyed upon by an unscrupulous tax return preparer; and 2) fraudulent or
intentional overclaims made by “those who know better.” Taxpayers in the
latter group know that they are not entitled to the refundable credit, but see
an opportunity to obtain a significant sum of money and perceive little risk
of being caught.8 While it is difficult to ascertain whether noncompliance is

6
Nina E. Olson, More Than a ‘Mere’ Preparer: Loving and Return Preparation, 139 TAX
NOTES 767 (2013) [hereinafter Olson, Loving].
7
Id. at 769. Olson wrote this specific passage in the context of the need for return preparer
standards to assure competency and professionalism. The preceding sentence noted that the “availability
of e-filing and the magnitude and frequency of claims for refundable tax credits have combined to make
tax return preparation a lucrative business for many.” With the goal of better understanding the
underlying cause of errors on commercially-prepared returns, Leslie Book authored a study on the role
of return preparers in facilitating taxpayer compliance; the study was included in the Taxpayer
Advocate’s 2007 Annual Report to Congress. Leslie Book, Study of the Role of Preparers in Relation to
Taxpayer Compliance with Internal Revenue Laws, in 2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 44 (2007).
8

While this article uses these two categories, it is important to recognize that incorrect claims
arise from a spectrum of behavior that is more nuanced. Social scientists Robert Kidder and Craig
McEwen set out a typology of tax noncompliance upon which Leslie Book has built in his scholarship
with respect to low-income taxpayers. See Robert Kidder & Craig McEwen, Taxpaying Behavior in
Social Context: A Tentative Typology of Tax Compliance and Noncompliance, in 2 TAXPAYER
COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 47 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989); Leslie
Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1145 (2003)
[hereinafter Book, One Size] (offering a detailed “typology of low income noncompliance”). This
typology is helpful in deciding upon ways to prevent noncompliance. For instance, in some cases a
credit overclaim may arise inadvertently as a result of an unintentional miscommunication between the
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intentional or inadvertent, Service data from a number of studies have been
interpreted to suggest that a significant percentage of—and perhaps most—
taxpayer noncompliance is inadvertent.9
If the Code is to be used to administer social programs, consideration
must be given as to what happens when a taxpayer makes an inadvertent
error. In this regard, it is instructive to look at how other federal agencies
tasked with administering social programs treat inadvertent and fraudulent
overpayments. As currently structured, the Code distinguishes between
inadvertent error and fraudulent overclaims. While the Code’s treatment of
fraudulent overclaims is consistent with how other agencies respond to
fraud, its treatment of inadvertent overclaims is not. In comparison, the
Code is punitive toward inadvertent error. When a refundable credit is
denied or reversed, the Service may impose the section 6662 accuracyrelated penalty, which is a 20% addition to tax.10 If the overclaim exceeds a
statutory computational threshold, the accuracy-related penalty is imposed
without any consideration of the taxpayer’s intent (or lack thereof). Thus, in
addition to having to pay back any refund that was issued, the taxpayer’s
mistake is compounded by an extra 20%. In contrast, programs such as the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Supplemental

taxpayer and the return preparer. This can happen, for example, because of a cultural misunderstanding
about the use of certain words. This type of honest miscommunication falls within what the article refers
to as “those who don’t know.” Within the category the article refers to as “those who know better,” there
is a range of behavior ranging from careless to reckless to intentional. Some taxpayers in this group may
self-prepare, while others may have their return prepared by an honest and competent preparer whom
they deliberately mislead as to the underlying facts during the preparation. In still other cases, taxpayer
and preparer may both knowingly collude to inflate the refund. For purposes of this article, the concern
is with how the Service penalizes unintentional noncompliance; I plan to return to the question of how
to prevent the underlying noncompliance in a future article that will critique the Service’s initiative to
regulate unlicensed return preparers and focus on particular ways in which increased regulation might
benefit unsophisticated taxpayers.
9
Nina E. Olson, Minding the Gap: A Ten-Step Program for Better Tax Compliance, 20 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 7 (2009); Complexity and the Tax Gap: Making Tax Compliance Easier and Collecting
What’s Due: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 112th Cong. 2–5 (2011) (statement of Nina E.
Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate); Closer Look at the Size and Sources of the Tax Gap: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and IRS Oversight of the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 4 (2006)
(statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate). These sources discuss noncompliance
generally, but similar conclusions have been drawn from studies examining inadvertent vs. intentional
noncompliance within the specific context of earned income credit overclaims. See infra note 41.
10

I.R.C. § 6662(a).
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Security Income (SSI) are not punitive in their treatment of inadvertent
error.
Within the context of social programs and complexity, this Article
examines and rethinks the application of the accuracy-related penalty to
unsophisticated and low-income taxpayers. Part I provides a historical
perspective on refundable credits, then discusses the complexity of these
credits and the shortcomings of the highly automated examination process.
Part II describes the accuracy-related penalty, its rationale, and the
applicable defenses. In light of these, it considers why the availability of a
good faith defense is an insufficient solution for the inadvertent errors that
are the concern of this article. Part III acknowledges the phenomenon of
fraudulent or intentional overclaims and the challenge of distinguishing
these from inadvertently erroneous overclaims. It seeks guidance for the
Service by analogy in examining how two other large agencies administer
social benefits. Concluding that it is not justifiable to penalize a taxpayer’s
innocent misunderstanding of a complex statutory regime, the article
proposes solutions to more appropriately distinguish between inadvertent
error and fraudulent claims.
I. REFUNDABLE CREDITS
This article focuses in particular on penalties that result from
erroneously claimed refundable credits because of those credits’ importance
to low-income taxpayers and because of the particular function that they
serve in our tax system. Refundable credits are sometimes known as
“negative income tax” because the taxpayer will receive a refund of the
credit to the extent it exceeds the tax due. Unlike a deduction or a
nonrefundable credit, a refundable credit functions as a payment to the
taxpayer. From a government perspective, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) treats the amount of the refundable credit that exceeds the tax
liability as an outlay, while the portion that reduces the amount tax due is
treated as a reduction in revenue.11

11

CBO REPORT, supra note 3, at 1. The report notes that it was prepared at the request of the
Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Finance.
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A. History and Purpose of Refundable Credits
The first refundable credit was a gasoline tax credit enacted in 1965,
which was the predecessor to today’s section 34 fuel tax credit.12 The
gasoline tax credit had been previously available to farmers on a separate
form, and Congress incorporated the credit into the individual income tax
form with the intention of increasing administrative efficiency for both
farmers and the Service.13
In 1975, Congress enacted the earned income tax credit (EITC),14
which was the only refundable credit for working families until the child
tax credit was enacted in 1997.15 The EITC was designed as an anti-poverty
measure,16 and together the EITC and child tax credit provide an important
safety net to low-income families.17 Each credit is based on earnings, is
adjusted for the number of children in the household, and is phased out at a

12
Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-44, § 809(c), June 21, 1965, 79 Stat. 167 (1965).
See I.R.C. § 39 (1965).
13

S. REP. NO. 89-324, at 54–55 (1965).

14

Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-12, § 204, 89 Stat. 30 (1975). See I.R.C. § 43 (1975).
The EITC is now located at I.R.C. § 32.
15
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 796 (1997); I.R.C. § 24. The
refundable portion of the child tax credit is known as the “additional child tax credit,” but this term does
not appear in the Code. See I.R.C. § 24(d). This article does not make a semantic distinction.
16
In calendar year 2009, the EITC “lifted approximately six million individuals, including
approximately three million children, out of poverty.” 1 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. NAT’L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 296 [hereinafter NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011
REPORT]. Lawrence Zelenak distinguishes the EITC from other anti-poverty programs because it is
predicated on the recipient earning income: “[r]ather than being a pure antipoverty program, the EITC is
a wage subsidy, phased in as earned income increases above zero and not phased out until earned
income exceeds the annual full-time minimum wage.” Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The
Administration of the Earned Income Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1903 (2005) [hereinafter Zelenak,
Welfare].
17

The child tax credit phases out at a much higher income level. It begins to gradually phase out
starting at an adjusted gross income of $110,000 for a married couple filing jointly, while for tax year
2013 the EITC is fully phased out for a married couple with three children whose adjusted gross income
exceeds $51,566. Thus, while both credits are valuable to low-income taxpayers, the child tax credit also
benefits taxpayers at a significantly higher income level. For an in-depth analysis of the differences
between the two credits, see Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate but Unequal,
54 EMORY L.J. 755 (2005).
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certain income level.18 These two refundable credits remain the most
significant for low-income taxpayers as well as to the U.S. Treasury. The
CBO estimates that the EITC will cost the government $68 billion in 2013,
of which $60 billion is the refundable portion that is counted as a budgetary
outlay;19 the child tax credit is estimated to cost $57 billion in the same
year.20
More recently, Congress has introduced other types of new refundable
credits as a method to temporarily incentivize spending towards particular
activities that are deemed desirable, including higher education,21 home
ownership,22 and adoption.23 These credits are based not on earnings but on
expenditures.24 Notably, Congress created yet another refundable credit in
connection with the Affordable Care Act: low- and moderate-income
taxpayers who purchase health insurance through an exchange beginning in
tax year 2014 will be eligible for a refundable credit to reduce the cost of
the health insurance.25 The CBO estimates that by 2021, the refundable tax
credit for health insurance will be the largest refundable tax credit.26
Refundable credits, particularly the EITC and the child tax credit, are
one way that the government has chosen to deliver benefits to its citizens.
The CBO posits that, at least in some respects, “receiving benefits from the

18
CBO REPORT, supra note 3, at 9–11. For a detailed explanation tracing how each credit has
been increased and expanded over time, see id. at 10–11.
19

Id. at 7.

20

Id. at 10 tbl.2. The report does not provide a specific estimate showing how much of this child
tax credit figure represents outlays as opposed to reduction in revenue, but the historical charts suggest
the outlay percentage is significantly lower for child tax credit than for EITC. See id. at 8 fig.3. As a
comparison to these figures, the total cost of the SNAP program was $78 billion in fiscal year 2012.
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation and Costs, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE,
http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/SNAPsummary.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2013).
21

I.R.C. § 25A.

22

I.R.C. § 36, see infra section B(2).

23

I.R.C. § 36C, see infra section B(3).

24

CBO REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.

25

Id. at 1. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 2702,
124 Stat. 119, 318–19 (2010); Elder Justice Act of 2010 §§ 6701–6703; I.R.C. § 32.
26

CBO REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
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[Service] is simpler for people than receiving them through other federal
and state agencies.”27 To the extent that receiving benefits on a tax return is
less burdensome, intrusive, or time-consuming than applying for other
types of government benefits, there is a higher rate of participation among
eligible recipients of refundable credits.28 Lawrence Zelenak has described
the EITC as “a welfare program that happens to be administered through
the tax system”29 while noting that self-declaring eligibility for benefits
through tax filing is a “sharp contrast” with the process for applying for
government benefits through other agencies, which generally require a
claimant to establish eligibility to the agency prior to the receipt of any
benefits.30
Delivering government through the Code has a downside, as described
by Olson, which is that the Service is not as well-equipped as other
agencies to administer social benefits: “the skills and training required to
administer social benefit programs are very different from the skills and
training that employees of an enforcement agency typically possess.”31
These differences, for better and for worse, result in disparate
overpayment rates between the Service and other agencies: because other
spending programs have more direct contact with their recipients, their
overpayment rates are much lower than the Service’s overpayment rate. On
the other hand, the costs for administering the benefits are also disparate.
The CBO cites the example of SNAP as having a typical overpayment rate
of less than 5%, with an administrative cost that is more than 9% of the

27

Id. at 17.

28

Id., noting that studies of other welfare transfer programs “show that participation declines as
the complexity of the application process increases.” See also Anne Alstott, The Earned Income Tax
Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995) (distinguishing
tax-based transfer programs from traditional welfare).
29

Zelenak, Welfare, supra note 16, at 1869.

30

Id. Zelenak includes as examples both welfare programs such as food stamps (now known as
SNAP), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and also “benefits to the middle class (such
as Social Security, Medicare, and subsidized college loans).” Id. at 1873.
31
1 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 24 [hereinafter NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2010 REPORT].
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total cost of the program.32 In contrast, the EITC has an estimated
overpayment rate of approximately 25%, but the cost to administer the
credit is less than 1% of the total cost of the EITC to the government.33
In Part III, this article will return to the comparison between
refundable credits and the social benefits programs administered by other
agencies. This Part will proceed next with a closer look at refundable
credits and the problems faced by the Service in administering the regime.
B. Refundable Credits and Complexity
Olson has addressed the complexity of the Code and the
accompanying administrative burdens on taxpayers. In her 2012 Annual
Report to Congress, she identified complexity as “the most serious problem
facing taxpayers—and the [Service].”34 Olson cites data showing that “there
have been approximately 4,680 changes to the tax code since 2001, an
average of more than one a day.”35 Olson’s report further notes:
“[i]ndividual taxpayers find return preparation so overwhelming that about
59 percent now pay preparers to do it for them. . . . An additional 30 percent
of individual taxpayers use tax software to help them prepare their returns,
with leading software packages costing $50 or more.”36
Recognizing that the Code is complex and preparer fees are a burden
on low-income taxpayers, the Service has continued to expand its efforts at
providing free income tax preparation to low-income taxpayers through its
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) and Tax Counseling for the
Elderly (TCE) sites. Though these sites are available in many cities

32
CBO REPORT, supra note 3, at 21, stating that “federal and state governments together spend
approximately $7 billion annually to administer the program (which paid out approximately $75 billion
in benefits in fiscal year 2011).”
33

Id.

34

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.

35

Id. at n.10, citing unpublished Commerce Clearing House (CCH) data provided to TAS as of
Dec. 12, 2012: “CCH advised us that its count of tax-law changes is somewhat understated, because
multiple changes to a section might be grouped together and counted as a single entry on its finding lists
of tax-law changes.”
36

Id. at 6.
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throughout the United States,37 only slightly more than 2% of individual
returns filed were prepared through a VITA or TCE site in fiscal year
2012.38 Unfortunately, free assistance may not be the lifeline of accuracy
that some are hoping for: TIGTA has reported a disturbingly high error rate
of 51% on the returns prepared for its auditors at IRS Volunteer Program
Sites.39
Studies on error rates reveal that unsophisticated taxpayers face
hurdles regardless of whether they choose to self-prepare, seek out free
assistance, or pay for tax return preparation.40 As discussed in section C
below, those who do face audit on refundable credit issues discover that the
process is highly automated and not very taxpayer friendly.
While it is undoubtedly difficult to measure, studies suggest that the
majority of errors made in claiming the EITC are inadvertent rather than
intentional, and that these errors are largely due to the complexity of the
statute.41 Complexity has many roots, including a congressional desire to
make the benefits more widely available under a variety of circumstances.
Complexity is further compounded each time Congress amends the statute,
even if the intention is to expand eligibility.

37
In fiscal year 2012, there were 13,143 Volunteer Tax Preparation Assistance sites. INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. 2012 DATA BOOK 47 tbl.19 (2012).
38
3,264,997 were prepared through VITA or TCE, comprising 2.2% of the 146,244,000
individual income tax returns that were filed in fiscal year 2012. Id. at 47 tbl.19; id. at 4 tbl.2.
39
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REF. NO. 2012-40-088, ENSURING THE QUALITY
REVIEW PROCESS IS CONSISTENTLY FOLLOWED REMAINS A PROBLEM FOR THE VOLUNTEER PROGRAM
(2012).
40

See infra note 55, for a discussion of paid preparers and error rates.

41

“IRS studies have acknowledged that the complexity of EITC rules contributes to the error
rates, and analysis of IRS data by Treasury experts as well as studies by outside researchers indicate that
a minority of EITC overpayments result from intentional action by tax filers.” ROBERT GREENSTEIN &
JOHN WANCHECK, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, REDUCING OVERPAYMENTS IN THE
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 2 (2013). See also Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring:
Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor Through the Tax System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1103, 1113 (2006)
(citing estimates of intentional EITC noncompliance ranging from 30% to 50%); and Book, One Size,
supra note 8, at 1166 (“[T]here is little data relating to how much EITC noncompliance is intentional,
although there is strong anecdotal evidence that a significant amount of EITC noncompliance is caused
by taxpayer ignorance or mistake.”).
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For individual taxpayers, four of the most significant refundable
credits from a dollar standpoint are the earned income tax credit (EITC), the
child tax credit, the first-time homebuyer credit (FTHBC), and the adoption
tax credit. The EITC and the child tax credit are based on earnings, have
been in effect since 1975 and 1998 respectively, have been amended and
expanded repeatedly since their enactment, and remain in the Code as
important ongoing relief for families. The FTHBC and the adoption tax
credit are based on expenditures rather than earnings, and these credits were
introduced more recently only as temporary incentives. The FTHBC was
available for tax years 2008, 2009, and 2010. The adoption tax credit was a
refundable credit for tax years 2010 and 2011, though it was previously and
is still available as a nonrefundable credit. Despite these differences, each
of the four shares some common traits: each one is complex, has proven
difficult for the Service to administer, and has been subject to a high audit
rate. While the article focuses primarily on those low-income taxpayers
who inadvertently overclaim EITC and child tax credit because those
credits serve as an earnings subsidy for families, the phenomenon of
unsophistication and the accuracy-related penalty extends to all four of
these refundable credits.
1. The Earned Income Credit and Child Tax Credit
The EITC statute is more than 2,500 words long. The statute contains
multiple eligibility requirements, many of which are cross-referenced from
other Code sections. As one example, section 32(c)(3)(A) defines
“qualifying child” to mean “a qualifying child of the taxpayer (as defined in
section 152(c)), determined without regard to paragraph 1(D) thereof and
section 152(e)).”42 Because of the complexity, the Service created detailed
instructions, worksheets, and a publication intended to explain the provision
in laymen’s terms. However, even these simplified explanations are
overwhelming: Publication 596, Earned Income Credit, is 62 pages long.
To help taxpayers determine eligibility, the Service website provides an
online tool called the “EITC Assistant.”43

42

I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A).

43

EITC Home Page—It’s easier than ever to find out if you qualify for EITC, DEPARTMENT OF
TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/EITC-Home-Page-It%E2%80%99s-easier-than-ever-to-find-out-if-you-qualify-for-EITC (last visited Aug. 12, 2013).

THE
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The determination of eligibility for EITC is fairly straightforward for
many taxpayers, such as a married couple with minor children who share
one household.44 However, it quickly becomes more complicated in other
cases. If the children split time among more than one household during a
given year, the parents must determine the child’s “principal place of
abode.”45 If the parents are divorced, the Code allows the custodial parent
to claim the EITC even if he or she releases the dependency exemption to
the non-custodial parent, in which case the non-custodial parent may be
eligible to claim the child tax credit.46 In other cases, such as when the
children’s parents are unmarried or in households in which multiple
generations live together, there may be two or more taxpayers who would
be eligible to claim the same qualifying child. The code does not allow
this—the child can only be claimed on one return—and provides yet
another set of complicated “tiebreaker” rules as to who can claim the
child.47 One problem with these tiebreaker rules is that they presume
sharing of information, such as adjusted gross income, among individuals
who may not all necessarily communicate with one another about financial
matters.48
The EITC requirements overlap with, but do not perfectly mirror, the
requirements for the three other so-called “family status” provisions in the
code: the dependency exemption, head of household filing status, and the

44
See Zelenak, Welfare, supra note 16, at 1870 (citing IRS studies indicating that “qualifying
child errors” were uncommon among parents filing joint returns and single mothers).
45

I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(B).

46

I.R.C. §§ 152(e), 32(c)(3)(A).

47

I.R.C. § 152(c)(4). For example,

if the parents of an individual may claim such individual as a qualifying child but no
parent so claims the individual, such individual may be claimed as the qualifying child or
another taxpayer but only if the adjusted gross income of such taxpayer is higher than the
highest adjusted gross income of any parent of the individual.
I.R.C. § 152(c)(4)(C).
48
For example, the unmarried parents of an infant may live with one of their sets of parents. It is
possible that the infant may meet the criteria of “qualifying child” as to several people in that household,
but can only be claimed by one taxpayer under the rules provided by § 152(c)(4). Without knowing the
adjusted gross income of both parents and whether one of the parents claimed the infant, the
grandparents cannot determine their eligibility, even though they may feel “most entitled” to claim the
EITC because they pay the household bills (the EITC is not based on level of support for the child).
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child tax credit.49 This leaves an unsophisticated taxpayer vulnerable to an
innocent mistake on multiple fronts for an audit. Together, these provisions
intersect; if all are denied, it can result in a deficiency of several thousand
dollars. Among many solutions she offers in her report, Olson recommends
that Congress consolidate the family status provisions as a measure to
simplify the Code.50 She notes that these provisions “continue to ensnare
taxpayers and make tax administration difficult simply because of the
number of such provisions and their structural interaction.”51
In addition to the complexity of the rules, there is evidence that
eligibility for EITC shifts significantly from year to year, by as much as
one-third of eligible taxpayers.52 Thus, it is not the same taxpayers claiming
the credit from year to year; rather, “one in three EITC taxpayers each year
is in a learning mode.”53
Despite the cost, the majority of low-income taxpayers seek help with
tax return preparation: according to Service data from tax year 2009, 66%
of all EITC returns were prepared by a paid preparer.54 This means, of
course, that roughly one-third of EITC recipients are trying to sort through
the complexities on their own. Interestingly, the one-third who self-prepare
may be less likely to face an audit: fiscal year 2010 data revealed that 75%
of EITC returns selected for audit were prepared by a paid preparer.55 Olson
believes this is due in part to the proliferation of unregulated return
preparers. Of 79 million individual income tax returns prepared by paid

49
I.R.C. §§ 151, 2, 24. The Taxpayer Advocate refers to these Code sections collectively as
“family status issues” in her Annual Report, and this article adopts this terminology.
50

1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.

51

Id.

52

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra note 16, at 297 n.5, citing TREASURY
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REF. NO. 2009-40-024, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
PROGRAM HAS MADE ADVANCES; HOWEVER, ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL COMPLIANCE
METHODS ARE NEEDED TO STOP BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN ERRONEOUS PAYMENTS 2 (2008).
53

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra note 16, at 297.

54

Id. at 300.

55

Id. at 302 n.44.

Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2013.23 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu

128 | Pittsburgh

Tax Review | Vol. 11 2013

preparers in 2011, roughly half were prepared by unregulated preparers.56
Olson has long advocated for a regime to regulate return preparers and
bring them under the ethical standards of Treasury Department Circular
230.57 She cites limited studies by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) and TIGTA in which auditors posing as taxpayers visiting paid
preparers and found an inconsistent level of competency and due diligence
procedures.58 In 2009, the Service conducted a Return Preparer Review and
solicited input through the public comment process. Its resulting
recommendations were published,59 and the U.S. Treasury Department
(“Treasury Department”) subsequently issued regulations that are referred
to collectively as the IRS Tax Return Preparer Initiative (RPI).60 Olson
posited in her 2011 Annual Report that the RPI would “significantly reduce
EITC error (and even fraud).”61 However, the RPI faced a significant
setback in 2013 and unknown future. A federal court ruled in favor of
return preparers who brought suit alleging that the Treasury Department
lacks the authority to regulate return preparers unless directed to do so by
Congress.62 The court enjoined the Service from mandatory enforcement of
the RPI regulations, and the case is on appeal to the D.C. Circuit.63
Section C, below, will examine the audit process for the EITC in
greater detail.

56
Olson, Loving, supra note 6, at 769. “Unregulated preparers” are those paid preparers who are
not subject to any professional regulation. The definition excludes attorneys, certified acceptance agents,
certified public accountants, enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, enrolled retirement plan agents, and
state regulated tax preparers. Id. at 769 n.14.
57
Id. at 768, noting in n.4 that she had testified to Congress on this issue in 1997 and 1998, prior
to her appointment as National Taxpayer Advocate.
58
Id. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-563T, PAID TAX RETURN
PREPARERS: IN A LIMITED STUDY, CHAIN PREPARERS MADE SERIOUS ERRORS (2006); TREASURY
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN, NO. 2008-40-171, MOST TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY A LIMITED
SAMPLE OF UNENROLLED PREPARERS CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT ERRORS (2008).
59

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 4832, RETURN PREPARER REVIEW

(2009).
60

Treas. Reg. § 1.6109-2 (2010); 31 C.F.R. pt. 10.

61

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra note 16, at 302.

62

Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74 (D.D.C. 2013).

63

Loving v. IRS, No. 13-5061 (D.C.C. Appeal filed Mar. 29, 2013).
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2. First-Time Homebuyer Credit
Enacted as a measure to stimulate the housing market,64 the FTHBC is
a refundable credit that was narrow in scope and temporary in duration
insofar as it is available one time only to a taxpayer who purchased a
principal residence on or after April 9, 2008 and before May 1, 2010. The
first iteration of the FTHBC was a refundable credit of up to $7,500 with a
very significant string attached: the recipient was required to repay the full
amount of the credit to the government, typically during a fifteen-year
recapture period.65 Thus, the refundable credit operated as an interest-free
loan. The next year, Congress increased the maximum available credit
amount to $8,000, twice extended the availability period, and sweetened the
incentive significantly relative to the original version: those eligible firsttime homebuyers who purchased a house in calendar year 2009 and 2010
were not required to repay the credit.66
As with the EITC, the FTHBC statute is long (approximately 2000
words) and complex, riddled with limitations and definitions that are crossreferenced to other code sections. As with the EITC, the FTHBC proved to
be both a headache for the Service to administer and a magnet for
fraudulent claims.67 To be sure (again, as with the EITC), some taxpayers

64
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R40153, THE FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYER CREDIT: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2009) (noting that the credit was intended to be temporary and was “intended to
address two housing market concerns: an excess supply of homes on the market and falling prices of
homes.”).
65
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2851, § 3011(a)
(July 30, 2008).
66
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No 111-5, 123 Stat. 316,
§ 1006(a)–(c). Worker, Homeownership and Business Assistance Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-92, 123
Stat. 2984, § 11(c)(1), (D)(e). Repayment was still required, however, in the event taxpayer disposed of
or ceased to reside in the property within 36 months of closing. I.R.C. § 36(f)(4)(D)(ii).
67
By October 2009, the IRS had identified over 160 potential schemes resulting in scores of
criminal investigations; moreover, it had selected more than 100,000 returns claiming the FTHBC for
examination. Administration of the First-Time Homebuyer Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 2009 WL 3390198 (2009) (statement of Linda E. Stiff,
Deputy Comr. for Services and Enforcement, Internal Revenue Service). For example, the Service
identified 580 instances of taxpayers younger than 18 years old claiming the FTHBC; these claims from
minors aggregated nearly $4 million. Implausibly, the youngest claim was from a four-year-old
taxpayer. Administration of the First-Time Homebuyer Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 2009 WL 3390199 (2009) (statement of J. Russell
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who “know better” made fraudulent claims. However, due to the novelty of
the credit, the complexity of the statute, and the fact that the statute was
amended twice shortly after originally enacted, other errors were certainly
inadvertent. The Taxpayer Advocate noted these complexities in a
statement to Congress in which she referred to the FTHBC as “perhaps the
most significant challenge for the Service and certain taxpayers [in the
2009] filing season”:
There are three different maximum credit amounts, two different eligibility
phase-outs based on adjusted gross income, two different eligible statuses (firsttime homebuyer and long-time resident) with special rules for military
personnel, and three different effective dates with separate eligibility dates for
entering into a contract and for completing the sale. There are also age limits,
home purchase price limits, and related-party rules.68

As section B of Part II will discuss, inadvertent FTHBC errors can be
subject to the section 6662 accuracy-related penalty. However, even if it is
determined that section 6662 does not apply, the Service can consider
whether to impose the newer “erroneous claim for refund” penalty under
section 6676. Part II will explain why this distinction matters to
unsophisticated taxpayers.
3. Adoption Tax Credit
Like the FTHBC, the adoption tax credit is an expenditure-based credit
created to incentivize behavior: by reducing the cost impediment, it was
intended to encourage adoption among low- and middle-income families.69
As originally enacted in 1996, the credit was not refundable.70 An
amendment in 2010 made the credit refundable for tax years 2010 and 2011
only.71 Large dollars were at stake: in tax year 2011, the maximum
available credit was $ 13,360 per child adopted.

George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration). See also the complete hearing at 2009 WL
3390478.
68
Hearing on Tax Filing Season Update: “Current IRS Issues” Before the Comm. on Finance
U.S. Senate (written statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate, at 5 n.13) (Apr. 15,
2010).
69

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT, supra note 1, at 111.

70

Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, § 1807(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 1899.

71

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10909, 124 Stat. 119, 1023

(2010).
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As with the FTHBC, the refundable nature of the adoption credit was
novel and complex. It was difficult for taxpayers to navigate72 and difficult
for the Service to administer.73 Due in large part to these challenges, a
stunning 69% of returns claiming the adoption credit were selected for audit
in tax year 2012.74 The majority of those audits were resolved in favor of
the taxpayer.75
While the Service was understandably concerned that such a large
refundable credit would attract fraudulent claims, the Service reported in
October 2011 that it “had not found any fraudulent adoption tax credit
claims, and there had been no referrals of adoption tax credit claims to its
Criminal Investigation unit.”76 This conclusion would suggest that most
(possibly even all) adoption credit overclaims were made erroneously and
in good faith.
Though the same concerns of unsophistication, complexity, and
accuracy apply to the adoption tax credit, Part II will not include a
discussion of the adoption tax credit. It does not lend itself to a good case
study because the rate of imposition of the accuracy-related penalty on
adoption credit overclaims is not publicly disclosed and at the time of
writing the author did not locate any U.S. Tax Court opinions involving an
overclaim of the refundable adoption tax credit. There is, however, reason
to believe that taxpayers who did not prevail in full on audit were subjected
to the accuracy-related penalty in cases in which the overclaim exceeded

72
The rules differed depending on whether the adoption was domestic or foreign, whether the
child had special needs, and the timing of the process. “Qualifying expenses” were not exhaustively
defined, leaving ambiguity as to whether certain expenses should be covered. See, e.g., INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2011 INSTRUCTIONS TO FORM 8839 (2011), http://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-prior/i8839--2011.pdf.
73
See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, MSP #7, THE IRS’S
COMPLIANCE STRATEGY FOR THE EXPANDED ADOPTION CREDIT HAS SIGNIFICANTLY AND
UNNECESSARILY HARMED VULNERABLE TAXPAYERS, HAS INCREASED COSTS FOR THE IRS, AND DOES
NOT BODE WELL FOR FUTURE CREDIT ADMINISTRATION (2013); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012
REPORT, supra note 1, at 111–33.
74

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT, supra note 1, at 111.

75

Id.

76

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-98, ADOPTION TAX CREDIT 10 (2011) (cited in
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT, supra note 1, at 120).
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$5,000.77 Therefore, it is important to mention the adoption tax credit as an
additional example of a social benefit that was administered through the
Code yet treated punitively if claimed erroneously.
C. EITC on Further Review: Audit Rates, Outcomes, and Accuracy
In a research study of refundable credits and noncompliance, Olson
critiques the design of the tax system and identifies a number of ways in
which the Service currently is not well-suited to administer social benefit
programs.78 She concludes that “noncompliance is not necessarily more
prevalent in refundable credits than any other type of tax incentive.”79 She
further concludes that “in addressing noncompliance, the traditional
[Service] approach to audits and collection can undermine the very policy
goals the program was designed to achieve.”80
This section will reveal in greater detail why refundable credits,
particularly the EITC and the child tax credit, are an imperfect way to
deliver social benefits. These benefits are intended to assist low-income
taxpayers who are, as Olson observed, “often the least educated and least
financially sophisticated” taxpayers.81 The credits are complex and there are
compelling reasons for the Service to regulate these programs carefully.
Unfortunately the correspondence audit process used to oversee the EITC
program is also imperfect and, in important respects, unsophisticated in its
own right. It is highly automated, making it inefficient: for instance, the
taxpayer lacks the opportunity to exchange information directly with one
designated representative throughout the process. It can be painstakingly

77
Part II, infra, explains how the “substantial understatement” definition is met by a
computational threshold. While anecdotal, there is evidence on adoption websites and blogs that the IRS
imposed the accuracy-related penalty on adoption tax credit audits. See, e.g., http://www.nacac.org/
taxcredit/faqs.html.
78
Olson names five design elements that “contribute to the level of noncompliance in refundable
credit programs: (1) fact-based eligibility requirements, (2) the lack of pre-certification procedures,
(3) characteristics of the target population, (4) the large size of the benefit amounts, and (5) the role of
return preparers in claiming the benefit.” 2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 83 (2009) [hereinafter NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2009 REPORT VOL. 2].
79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Olson, Loving, supra note 6, at 769.

Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2013.23 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu

Vol. 11 2013 | Balancing Un(Sophistication) |

133

slow, with taxpayers who appeal the outcome in Tax Court and prevail
typically waiting nearly a year and a half to receive a refund that might
represent more than a quarter of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.82
Most troubling of all, an audit determination disallowing the family status
provisions is not conclusively indicative of ineligibility and, in a significant
percentage of cases, a disallowance was later determined to be incorrect
upon administrative appeal.83
EITC audits comprise approximately one-third of all individual
taxpayer audits, with the Service examining more than half a million EITC
returns annually.84 Taxpayers claiming the EITC are “almost twice as likely
to be examined as other individual filers.”85 What is at stake in these audits?
For many taxpayers, the proposed deficiency is several thousand dollars. In
tax year 2013 the maximum EITC amount for a taxpayer with three or more
qualifying children will be $6,044.86 If the Service is simultaneously
challenging one or more of the family status provisions, this further
increases the amount at stake. The child tax credit is a maximum refundable
credit of $1,000 per child and each dependency exemption is a $3,900
deduction.87
As will be discussed in Part II, if the understatement of tax is greater
than $5,000, the Service proposes an accuracy-related penalty of 20% based
on a computational formula and generally without inquiry into the
taxpayer’s intent.88 Due to the size of the refundable credits coupled with
dependency exemptions, it is not at all uncommon for a family status audit

82

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT, supra note 1, at 86.

83

See infra text accompanying notes 101, 113.

84

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT, supra note 1, at 75; NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE
2011 REPORT, supra note 16, at 296, 300. See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 2012 DATA BOOK, supra
note 37, at tbl.9a (2012). The 2012 data show an audit rate of approximately 2% for returns with EITC,
compared to a 1% rate overall. In 2012, 558,531 returns with EITC were examined, comprising 37.7%
of the 1,481,966 total individual income tax returns examined. Id. at col. 2.
85

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra note 16, at 300.

86

Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444, 447. The maximum available EITC for one qualifying
child will be $3,250, and the maximum EITC for two qualifying children will be $5,372.
87

Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444, 448.

88

I.R.M. 20.1.5.8.3.
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to result in an understatement in excess of this $5,000 computational
threshold. Thus, if the Service upholds its determination, the taxpayer will
owe not just the deficiency, but an additional 20% penalty and interest
accrued on both amounts. The taxpayer who makes an inadvertent error is,
in effect, penalized for his or her lack of sophistication in the face of a
system riddled with complexity.
While the high audit rate on EITC claims is striking, it is not without
reason: the Service estimated that its EITC error rate for fiscal year 2011
was between 21 and 26%, resulting in improper payments of somewhere
between $13.7 and $16.7 billion.89 The Improper Payment Information Act
of 200290 requires federal agencies to estimate the amount of improper
payments made annually.91 The EITC program is the only program the
Service has defined as “high-risk.”92 The Service has made little progress in
reducing improper payments of EITC since it began estimating and
reporting these amounts; since 2003, improper payment rates have
decreased slightly (down from a high estimate of 25–30% improper
payments), but the overall dollar value of the improper payments has
steadily increased over time.93
However, the data underlying these improper EITC payments are
controversial: Olson has highlighted studies suggesting that these Service
estimates “may be flawed and [are] most likely significantly overstated”94
in that they are based on audit results including the 70% of taxpayers who

89

TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REF. NO. 2012-40-028, THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL IMPROPER PAYMENTS ELIMINATION AND
RECOVERY ACT REQUIREMENTS 5 fig.2 (2012) [hereinafter TIGTA REPORT 2012].
90
Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-300, 116 Stat. 2350 (2002). The
Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-204, 124 Stat. 2224 (2010),
amended the 2002 act to strengthen reporting requirements. TIGTA REPORT 2012, supra note 89, at 1.
91

TIGTA REPORT 2012, supra note 89, at 1.

92

Id. at 2.

93

Id. at 5 fig.2, “EITC Improper Payments for Fiscal Years 2003 to 2011.”

94

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra note 16, at 298. See also Karie DavisNozemack, Unequal Burdens in EITC Compliance, 31 LAW & INEQ. 37, 69–70 (2012) (discussing
various reasons why EITC improper payment data may be overstated).
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do not respond to the automated correspondence audit letter.95 Olson has
written and testified extensively on the flaws of the audit process, which
stem in part from the highly factual nature of the credit’s requirements and
the unsophistication of the taxpayers, and has pointed out that an EITC
denial in many cases means that the taxpayer could not prove eligibility
rather than that the taxpayer was ineligible.96
Much has been written about the increased automation of tax
administration.97 Automation affords the Service greater efficiency in a
political reality defined by limited resources. But it does so at a cost to
individual taxpayers, particularly the low-income taxpayer population, and
one of the best examples is the EITC audit process. Almost always
conducted by correspondence, the EITC audit process is highly
automated.98 The Automated Correspondence Examination software
processes cases “with minimal to no tax examiner involvement until a

95
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra note 16, at 298 n.18 (citing fiscal year 2010
figures from the IRS Automated Information Management System).
96

See, e.g., Hearing on Improper Payments in the Admin. of Refundable Tax Credits Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight, Comm. on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 2011 WL
2036007 (2011) (Written Statement of Nina Olson):
Two Taxpayer Advocate Service studies have demonstrated that the denial of an
EITC claim proves merely that the IRS did not accept it, not necessarily that the taxpayer
was not eligible for the EITC. As with all taxpayers who claim deductions and credits
under the Internal Revenue Code, EITC taxpayers must substantiate their claims for the
credit. In many cases, however, the IRS’s narrow and rigid internal rules and training
about what documentation its auditors will accept as proof of residency and relationship
lead to improperly denied claims.
Id. at 14.
97
See Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm
Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Bryan T. Camp,
Theory and Practice in Tax Administration, 29 VA. TAX REV. 227 (2009); 2 NAT’L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS at 1–62 (2011) [hereinafter NAT’L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT VOL. 2]; Nina E. Olson, A Brave New World: The Taxpayer Experience in a
Post-Sequester IRS, 139 TAX NOTES 1189 (2013) [hereinafter Olson, Brave New World].
98

“In fiscal year (FY) 2010, 86 percent of individual audits were conducted by correspondence,
and 42 percent concluded with no personal contact with the IRS whatsoever.” NAT’L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT VOL. 2, supra note 97, at 300. Davis-Nozemack, supra note 94, at n.178, cites
the 2010 IRS Data Book tbl.9a, which shows nearly 97% of audited EITC returns were correspondence
audits.
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taxpayer reply is received.”99 The Taxpayer Advocate has criticized this
approach as “particularly inappropriate for low income workers who face
literacy challenges and are often transient.”100 She has also argued that the
automated process “sometimes leads [the Service] to deny taxpayers the
credit Congress intended them to have.” A study suggested that when the
automation is revisited and the Service takes a “second look” at denied
EITC claims, the taxpayer often prevails in full or in part.101
The Taxpayer Advocate Service conducted a research study of “audit
barriers” to better understand EITC audit outcomes.102 Among the
interesting findings, the study revealed that the letters used in
correspondence audits were not clear to the recipients: more than 25% of
the EITC taxpayers it surveyed “did not understand the [Service] was
auditing their return”; 39% “did not understand what the [Service] was
questioning about their EI[T]C claim”; and only 50% “felt they knew what
they needed to do in response to the audit letter.”103
Many taxpayers are unrepresented on audit,104 which compounds these
audit barriers. The Taxpayer Advocate raised lack of representation as a
concern based on a 2004 study showing that “taxpayers who used a
representative during the audit process were nearly twice as likely to be
determined EI[T]C eligible when compared to taxpayers without
representation.”105

99

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra note 16, at 301 n.38.

100

Id. at 301. In a more recent speech, Olson characterized correspondence audits of low-income
taxpayers as an approach that “den[ies] the basic humanity of the taxpayer.” Olson, Brave New World,
supra note 97, at 1192.
101

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT, supra note 1, at 75.

102

2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 103 (2007) [hereinafter
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2007 REPORT VOL. 2].
103

Id. at 103–04.

104

Davis-Nozemack, supra note 94, notes a study in which 98% of taxpayers were unrepresented
during EITC examinations (citing NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2007 REPORT VOL. 2, supra note 102,
at 102).
105

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2007 REPORT VOL. 2, supra note 102, at 108.
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Unlike field and office audits, which are conducted by Revenue
Agents, correspondence audits are conducted by Tax Examiners.106 While a
Revenue Agent is required to have a four-year degree with an emphasis in
accounting, a Tax Examiner is an entry-level position that requires only a
high school diploma or GED and no accounting background.107 Tax
Examiners are trained to consult Service publications rather than the Code,
regulations, or case law.108 They are not afforded the training to appreciate
the nuances of the EITC or the discretion to accept substantiation that
supports EITC eligibility yet falls outside their specified list of allowable
documentation.109
In most cases, the taxpayer does not contest the audit outcome and the
tax is assessed against the taxpayer.110 Many of these taxpayers simply give
up in frustration or do not understand their rights of appeal. Many do not
ever reply to the notice, even though studies show that some people who do
not reply are actually entitled to the credit. According to a TIGTA report,
60% of EITC audits are conducted by correspondence before the credit is
paid.111 Of these taxpayers, nearly 70% do not respond to the audit inquiry
letter, resulting in an EITC denial.112 A Taxpayer Advocate Service
research study of audit reconsideration requests in EITC cases found that of
these cases closed because there was “no response” from the taxpayer,

106

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT VOL. 2, supra note 97, at 76.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 77.

109

Id. at 77–78.

110

2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 82 (2012) [hereinafter
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT VOL. 2].
111
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra note 16, at 82 (citing TREASURY
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REF. NO. 2011-40-023, REDUCTION TARGETS AND STRATEGIES
HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED TO REDUCE THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN IMPROPER EARNED INCOME
CREDITS EACH YEAR 29 (2011)).
112

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra note 16, at 83.
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approximately 43% of taxpayers prevailed at audit reconsideration and had
some or all of the EITC restored.113
The small percentage of taxpayers who are savvy or persistent enough
to petition the Tax Court are likely to settle their case rather than proceed to
trial. To better understand why, the Taxpayer Advocate Service studied a
sample of 256 Tax Court cases in which the Service conceded that the
taxpayer was entitled to the EITC (though had been denied such at the audit
level).114 Several interesting findings support the notion that EITC audits
are inefficient and inaccurate. For instance, taxpayers often have the
documentation necessary to substantiate the EITC claim, but are not
successful in doing so during the automated audit process.115 In
approximately 20% of the cases studied, an Appeals Officer or Chief
Counsel attorney accepted documents that the Tax Examiner had
rejected.116 A primary reason for this is that Tax Examiners lack the training
and/or the discretion to accept the substantiation provided because the
document was not specifically listed in the Internal Revenue Manual.117 In
5% of the cases studied, the Service conceded after concluding that the Tax
Examiner misapplied the law118—a significant error rate, considering the
high stakes for these taxpayers.
Unfortunately, the majority of unsophisticated and unrepresented
taxpayers navigate these correspondence audits without fully appreciating
their rights or the availability of free counsel through the Low-Income
Taxpayer Grant program. Not having read the Taxpayer Advocate reports
on this subject, these taxpayers are not aware that contesting their claim in
Tax Court will allow them to work with a better trained adversary who is
afforded broader discretion in accepting documents to substantiate the
claim. Frustrated by the process and overwhelmed at responding to a

113
Id. at 83 (citing a study from 2004). The taxpayers who prevailed upon audit reconsideration
“received on average about 96 percent of what they had originally claimed on their returns.” Id. (citing 2
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 9 (2004)).
114

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT VOL. 2, supra note 110, at 84.

115

Id. at 77.

116

Id. at 89.

117

Id. at 79–80.

118

Id. at 90.
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faceless bureaucracy, many taxpayers do not understand how the numbers
are calculated, and many do not even realize that the Service has assessed a
20% accuracy-related penalty in addition to denying the claim. Ironically, it
is this same lack of sophistication that could form a basis for requesting an
abatement of that 20% penalty—if only the taxpayers knew such a defense
existed.
II. CIVIL PENALTIES—WHY AND HOW THE SERVICE IMPOSES A PENALTY
ON INACCURACY
Part I explored the rationales of refundable credits as social benefits
and the complexity of several statutory provisions. The Service determines
by audit whether it believes that the payment of a refundable credit is or
was improper. As Part II will explain in detail, the Service may demand
more than mere repayment of the improperly claimed credit. Upon audit,
the Service often invokes section 6662 to impose a 20% accuracy-related
penalty in addition to the deficiency. For refundable credits other than the
EITC, if the section 6662 penalty does not apply, it is possible that a 20%
“erroneous claim for refund” penalty may be imposed under the newer and
less-commonly used section 6676. While this article focuses primarily on
section 6662 and its defenses, it will also consider the role that section 6676
might play in non-EITC cases.
In order to gauge the appropriateness of the Service imposing the
section 6662 accuracy-related penalty in the context of refundable credits, it
is helpful first to understand why the penalty and its defense exist. What is
the penalty meant to accomplish? When is it appropriate to impose the
penalty? When is it appropriate to abate the penalty? Moreover, what does
the government hope to accomplish through the imposition of penalties
generally? This section will examine the Service policy statements on
penalties, as well as the accuracy-related penalty and its reasonable cause
defense.
A. Why Does the Code Impose Penalties?
The Service has an official policy statement on penalties. The current
version is Policy Statement 20-1, which was approved on June 29, 2004.
The primary thrust of the policy statement is that “penalties are used to
enhance voluntary compliance by: a) demonstrating the fairness of the tax
system to compliant taxpayers; and b) increasing the cost of
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noncompliance.”119 The policy statement also states that “in order to make
the most efficient use of penalties, the Service will design, administer, and
evaluate penalty programs based on how those programs can most
efficiently encourage voluntary compliance.”120
The Internal Revenue Manual notes that penalties “also serve to bring
additional revenues into the Treasury and indirectly fund enforcement costs.
However, these results are not reasons for creating or imposing
penalties.”121
The policy statement helps us to understand the Service’s view of
penalties, but what about the taxpayer’s perspective? Must a taxpayer be
aware of the existence of a penalty in order for it to be effective? If a
taxpayer lacks a meaningful understanding of the penalty or a fair
opportunity to respond, is the Service achieving the intended effect by
imposing a penalty? Or is the taxpayer merely being penalized with a larger
assessment without any coherent connection to the rationale for imposing a
penalty? Olson expressed this concern in her 2008 Annual Report to
Congress, stating that “[p]enalties cannot promote voluntary compliance if
taxpayers do not understand them.”122
In the correspondence exam unit, which includes almost all EITC
exams, the accuracy-related penalty proposal is highly automated. The
letter used to propose the penalty does not include contact information for
the examiner, the examiner does not call the taxpayer to solicit any
explanation for the taxpayer’s position, and the penalty is assessed
automatically in cases in which the taxpayer cannot be located.123 This level
of automation is not consistent with the Service’s own policy statement,
which states:
In order to effectively use penalties to encourage compliant conduct, examiners
and their managers must consider the applicability of penalties in each case, and

119

I.R.M. 1.2.20.1.1(3).

120

I.R.M. 1.2.20.1.1(2).

121

I.R.M. 20.1.1.2.1(4).

122

2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 9 (2008)
[hereinafter NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2008 REPORT].
123

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT VOL. 2, supra note 110, at 155.
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fully develop the penalty issue when the initial consideration indicates that
penalties should apply. That is, examiners and their managers must consider the
elements of each potentially applicable penalty and then fully develop the facts
to support the application of the penalty, or to establish that the penalty does not
apply, when the initial consideration indicates that penalties should apply. Full
development of the penalty issue is important for Appeals to sustain a penalty
and for Counsel to successfully defend that penalty in litigation.124

This problem is compounded by the fact that low-income taxpayers do
not always fully understand the correspondence audit process,125 and
because of automation they lack an opportunity to work with a designated
individual throughout the process. While the audit process does afford
taxpayers an opportunity to respond to a penalty, that may not be clear to an
unsophisticated taxpayer. The automation of the audit process, including
the process for imposition of penalties, may frustrate the purposes that
penalties are intended to serve.
As section C of Part II will explore, there are various ways to
challenge the imposition of the accuracy-related penalty. However, the
current process is not an effective way to encourage voluntary compliance.
To the extent that it penalizes unsophisticated taxpayers who error in good
faith, the current process may in fact undermine perceptions of fairness.
Olson has expressed concern that “undeserved penalty assessments are
probably more likely to discourage taxpayers from complying by
communicating that the system is unfair and that they may be penalized
even if they try to comply.”126
B. Section 6662: The Accuracy-Related Penalty
Section 6662, the modern-day “accuracy-related penalty,” was enacted
in 1989 as a consolidation of several separate pre-existing penalties.127 Prior

124

I.R.M., supra note 119.

125

See discussion of audit barriers, supra notes 102–03.

126

See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT VOL. 2, supra note 110, at 156.

127

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7721, 103 Stat. 2106,
2395 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6662 (2012)). The penalties for negligence and
understatement existed prior to this; the act consolidated several penalties into one code section subject
to a 20% penalty rate. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1388–89 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1906, 2859. Prior to this, negligence was subject to a 5% penalty and substantial understatement was
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to its enactment, the Code provided separate civil penalties relating to
accuracy, including negligence, substantial understatement, and
misvaluation; however, the penalty rates varied and there was no statutory
prohibition on stacking.128 The current incarnation of the accuracy-related
penalty provides: “[i]f this section applies to any portion of an
underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return, there shall be added
to the tax an amount equal to 20 percent of the portion of the underpayment
to which this section applies.”129 Underpayment is defined in section
6664(a)130 and is expressed in Treasury Department Regulation 1.6664-2 as
the algebraic formula:
Underpayment = W−(X+Y−Z), where W = the amount of income tax imposed;
X = the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return; Y = amounts not
so shown previously assessed (or collected without assessment); and Z = the
amount of rebates made.

Section 6662(b) provides the list of seven instances to which a portion
of an underpayment might apply.131 In fiscal year 2012, the Service

subject to a 25% penalty. The accompanying House Report stated the committee’s belief “that the
number of different penalties that relate to accuracy of a tax return, as well as the potential for
overlapping among many of these penalties, causes confusion among taxpayers and leads to difficulties
in administering these penalties by the IRS.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1388.
128
H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 952, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, at 2423. The
prohibition on stacking is found in I.R.C. § 6662(b), which provides that the penalty applies to “1 or
more” of the specific reasons for underpayment and further provides that § 6662 “shall not apply” when
a penalty is imposed under § 6663 (relating to fraud) or § 6662A (relating to reportable transactions).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2(c) (2003).
129

I.R.C. § 6662(a).

130

I.R.C. § 6664(a) provides that an underpayment is:
the amount by which any tax imposed by this title exceeds the excess of—
(1) the sum of—
(A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return, plus
(B) amounts not so shown previously assessed (or collected without
assessment), over
(2) the amount of rebates made.
For purposes of paragraph (2), the term “rebate” means so much of an
abatement, credit, refund, or other repayment, as was made on the ground
that tax imposed was less than the excess of the amount specified in
paragraph (1) over the rebates previously made.

131

I.R.C. § 6662(b) provides, in relevant part:
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assessed an accuracy-related penalty on more than 600,000 returns, for a
total dollar amount of more than $1.38 billion.132 While the accuracyrelated penalty is broad in its application, this article is concerned with two
specific bases for imposition of the accuracy-related penalty: 1) “negligence
or disregard of rules or regulations”133 and 2) “any substantial
understatement of income tax.”134 The former is based on a statutory
definition, while the latter is a statutory computational threshold. Thus,
unlike the negligence basis, the substantial understatement basis can be
justified by the Service based solely on a number, without factual
development.
1. Negligence or Disregard of Rules or Regulations
Negligence is defined as including “any failure to make a reasonable
attempt to comply with the provisions of this title.”135 “Disregard” is
defined to include “any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard.”136 The
Internal Revenue Manual defines these terms as follows:
Disregard of rules or regulations are: “Careless” if the taxpayer does not exercise
reasonable care to determine the correctness of a tax return. “Reckless” if the
taxpayer makes little or no effort to determine if a rule or regulation exists, under
circumstances demonstrating a substantial deviation from a reasonable standard

This section shall apply to the portion of any underpayment which is
attributable to 1 or more of the following:
(1) Negligence or disregard of rules or regulations.
(2) Any substantial understatement of income tax.
(3) Any substantial valuation misstatement under chapter 1.
(4) Any substantial overstatement of pension liabilities.
(5) Any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement.
(6) Any disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction
lacking economic substance (within the meaning of section 7701(o)) or
failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law.
(7) Any undisclosed foreign financial asset understatement.
132

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 2012 DATA BOOK, supra note 37, at 42 tbl.17.

133

I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1).

134

I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2).

135

I.R.C. § 6662(c).

136

Id.
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of conduct. “Intentional” if the taxpayer knows of a rule or regulation and
ignores that rule or regulation.137

The Treasury Department Regulations elaborate further on the
definition of negligence and provide an exception for adequate
disclosure.138 Notable to the topic of low-income taxpayers, the regulations
provide that “[n]egligence is strongly indicated where . . . a taxpayer fails to
make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of a deduction, credit
or exclusion on a return which would seem to a reasonable and prudent
person to be ‘too good to be true’ under the circumstances.”139
2. Substantial Understatement of Income Tax
An understatement is “substantial” according to the following
computation: “if the amount of the understatement for the taxable year
exceeds the greater of—(i) 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on
the return for the taxable year, or (ii) $5,000.”140 Understatement is also
expressed in Treasury Department Regulation 1.6662-4(b)(2) as the
algebraic formula:
Understatement = X−(Y−Z), where X = the amount of the tax required to be
shown on the return; Y = the amount of the tax imposed which is shown on the
return; and Z = any rebate.

These are the two bases for the accuracy-related penalty that a lowincome taxpayer is most likely to encounter. When the Service proposes the
accuracy-related penalty on exam, it does not specify the particular
paragraph of subsection 6662(b) that is the basis for the penalty. In other
words, the taxpayer (and his or her counsel, if represented) will not know
from the exam report whether the penalty is proposed for negligence or for
substantial understatement.

137

I.R.M. 20.1.5.7.2(3).

138

Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)-(c) (2003). The focus of this article is on unsophisticated taxpayers
who self-prepare returns; the adequate disclosure exception is not typically implicated in these
situations.
139

Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(ii) (2003).

140

I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A). An understatement is defined in § 6662(d)(2) to mean “the excess of—
(i) the amount of the tax required to be shown on the return for the taxable year, over (ii) the amount of
the tax imposed which is shown on the return, reduced by any rebate (within the meaning of
§ 6211(b)(2)).”
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Irrespective of the particular basis under 6662(b) for the imposition of
the accuracy-related penalty, section 6664(c) provides a defense that
taxpayers may raise once the penalty has been proposed. This so-called
“reasonable cause” defense is examined in section C, below. But before
turning to the defense and other legal challenges, it is useful to review the
Service procedures for proposing the accuracy-related penalty.
The Internal Revenue Manual directs examiners to consider the
application of penalties during the examination process, noting that the
accuracy-related penalty and other penalties are “important deterrents to
non-compliance.”141 Some of the Code’s penalties, including the accuracyrelated penalty in certain cases, can be automatically assessed; outside of
these exceptions the Code provides that the examiner’s initial determination
of a penalty assessment must be approved in writing by his or her
immediate supervisor.142 In either case, the taxpayer can raise a defense
during the examination process. If the underlying tax is subject to
deficiency procedures, the taxpayer can also challenge an accuracy-related
penalty assessment in Tax Court.143
As will be discussed further in section C, the Tax Court is an impartial
forum in which to contest the accuracy-related penalty. However, the
burden is on the taxpayer to raise a defense to the penalty. Unfortunately,
the opportunities and methods by which to challenge the accuracy-related
penalty are unknown to the very people who are most likely to succeed in
raising them: the unsophisticated taxpayer.

141
I.R.M. 20.1.5.1(5). I.R.M. 20.1.5.1.5(3) also includes the fraud penalty and the erroneous
claims for refund or credit penalty in its list of penalties that are “important deterrents to noncompliance.” See also I.R.M. 20.1.5.3(2).
142
I.R.C. § 6751(b)(1). Certain penalties, including those automatically calculated through
electronic means, are excluded from this requirement. § 6751(b)(2). For example, if a taxpayer fails to
report W2 income on his or her return, the Automated Underreporter (AUR) program will assess the
accuracy-related penalty electronically. In such a case, a taxpayer still will have the opportunity to
respond to the proposed penalty and raise a defense. I.R.M. 20.1.5.1.6(9).
143

See I.R.C. § 6213; I.R.M. 20.1.5.2(11).

Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2013.23 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu

146 | Pittsburgh

Tax Review | Vol. 11 2013

C. The Reasonable Cause Defense and Other Legal Challenges to the
Accuracy-Related Penalty
1. Section 6664: Reasonable Cause Defense
Section 6664(c)(1) provides an exception to the accuracy-related
penalty, stating that “no penalty shall be imposed under section 6662” if the
taxpayer shows that there was “reasonable cause” for the underpayment and
that the taxpayer acted in “good faith.” In fiscal year 2012, the Service
abated 58,661 accuracy-related penalties.144 According to the Treasury
Department Regulations:
The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in
good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts
and circumstances. Generally, the most important factor is the extent of the
taxpayer’s effort to assess the taxpayer’s proper tax liability. Circumstances that
may indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest
misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all the facts and
circumstances, including the experience, knowledge, and education of the
taxpayer.145

The Internal Revenue Manual also specifically mentions sophistication
as a factor, stating:
Circumstances that may suggest reasonable cause and good faith include an
honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of the facts,
including the experience, knowledge, sophistication and education of the
taxpayer. The taxpayer’s mental and physical condition, as well as sophistication
with respect to the tax laws at the time the return was filed, are relevant in
deciding whether the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause. If the taxpayer is
misguided and unsophisticated in tax law, but acts in good faith, a penalty is not
warranted.146

This instruction in the manual presumes that an examiner is
thoughtfully considering the imposition of the penalty. However, the
automated nature of the correspondence audit process does not lend itself
naturally to an evaluation of whether a taxpayer is “misguided and

144
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 2012 DATA BOOK, supra note 37, at 42 tbl.17. Note that this figure
includes not just § 6662, but also § 6662A (understatement of reportable transactions) and § 6653
(underpayment of stamp tax).
145

Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (2003).

146

I.R.M. 20.1.5.6.3. (emphasis added).

Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2013.23 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu

Vol. 11 2013 | Balancing Un(Sophistication) |

147

unsophisticated in tax law” but “acts in good faith.” To the extent that the
imposition of the accuracy-related penalty is based strictly on a
computational threshold, the onus is entirely on the unsophisticated
taxpayer to recognize the significance of the penalty and raise the defense.
In its 2013 report on refundable credits, the CBO cited census data in
noting a correlation between refundable credits, complexity, and lack of
sophistication:
The challenges arising from complexity are probably exacerbated by certain
characteristics of the population toward whom refundable credits are targeted.
Relative to the rest of the filing population, a higher proportion of low-income
filers are likely to be high school dropouts or to be from countries in which
English is not the main language.147

This concern is especially pronounced for unrepresented and
unsophisticated taxpayers who face the “audit barriers” discussed in Part
I148 or who do not have any personal contact with the Service during the
audit.149 Thus, the reasonable cause defense presents a conundrum for the
very taxpayers it is meant to benefit: if one is inexperienced, has little to no
knowledge of tax law, and has relatively little formal education, how would
that person know to invoke the reasonable cause defense?
In Tax Court, the burden of production is on the Commissioner to
show evidence in support of its imposition of the accuracy-related
penalty.150 It is, however, the taxpayer who bears the burden of proof with
respect to the reasonable cause defense.151 Among other factors, the Tax
Court has held that the taxpayer’s sophistication with respect to the tax laws
at the time the return was filed is relevant in deciding whether the taxpayer
acted with reasonable cause; if the taxpayer is unsophisticated in tax law
and acts in good faith, a penalty is not warranted.152 Studies of cases

147

CBO REPORT, supra note 3, at 18.

148

See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2007 REPORT VOL. 2, supra note 102, at 103–04.

149

See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra note 16, at 300.

150

I.R.C. § 7491(c).

151

Higbee v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. 438, 448 (2001).

152

See, e.g., Kees v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1374, 1999 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 99,041 (1999);
Collins v. Comm’r, 857 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1988).
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spanning all issues for which the accuracy-related penalty is imposed (not
just refundable credits) and including both individual and business
taxpayers (not just unsophisticated taxpayers) reveal that the Service
prevails more often than not when taxpayers raise the good faith and
reasonable cause defense.153
How frequently does the Service assert the accuracy-related penalty in
the refundable credit context? It is not known, but Olson reported that in tax
year 2000 the Service “issued approximately 17,300 EITC deficiency
notices involving accuracy-related penalties.”154
As noted in Part I, relatively few taxpayers dispute their audit outcome
in Tax Court; among those who do, the vast majority of cases are settled
rather than tried and decided.155 For this reason, there is not a very
extensive body of case law on refundable credits and the accuracy-related
penalty.156 This article considered a small sample of cases in which: 1) the

153
The Code requires the Taxpayer Advocate to identify in her annual report the ten tax issues
most litigated in federal court. I.R.C. § 7803(c)(2)(B)(ii)(X). Accuracy-related penalties appear on the
“most litigated” list every year, and the annual reports provide an analysis of the outcome of all
identified published cases. The following figures are the percentage of cases, as reported by the
Taxpayer Advocate Reports, in which the IRS prevailed in full on a 6662(b)(1) or (b)(2) claim in the
fiscal year preceding the report: 2005: 68% (1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 516 [hereinafter NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2005 REPORT]); 2006: 68% (1 NAT’L
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 589 [hereinafter NAT’L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE 2006 REPORT]); 2007: 63% (1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 621); 2008: 70% (1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS;
2009: 82% (1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 454); 2010: 69%
(NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2010 REPORT, supra note 31, at 452); 2011: 65% (NAT’L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra note 16, at 646); 2012: 66% (NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012
REPORT, supra note 1, at 589).
154
1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 90. See also Carlton M.
Smith, IRS Wrongly Ignores the 20 Percent Excessive Refund Penalty, 138 TAX NOTES 973, 975–76
(2013). Extrapolating a “guesstimate” from the figure cited by Olson for tax year 2000, Smith estimates
that the IRS has sought “perhaps as much as $300 million in penalties” on refundable credit
disallowances since 1989 under an erroneous interpretation of the word “underpayment” in section
6664(a). Id. at 973. Smith’s interpretation of “underpayment” is discussed in section 2 of Part II, infra.
155

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT VOL. 2, supra note 110, at 181–83.

156

For the period 2006–2010, “family status issues” were included in the Taxpayer Advocate’s
“most litigated” list every year, with the number of family status decisions identified by TAS ranging
from 34 in the lowest year to 48 in the highest year. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2010 REPORT, supra
note 31, at 495. Many family status issues do not include an EITC claim. Family status issues did not
appear on the top ten list in the 2011 or 2012 annual report. Instead, the 2012 report included a study of
a sample of 256 Tax Court cases in which the EITC claim was conceded in full by the IRS without trial.
See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT VOL. 2, supra notes 114–18.
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primary issues were family status issues including the EITC (rather than the
primary issues being unreported income or unsubstantiated business
deductions); 2) the accuracy-related penalty was proposed upon exam; and
3) the court considered the reasonable cause and good faith defense. The
outcomes in this sample of cases were fairly evenly mixed.
In some instances, IRS Counsel disputed the taxpayer’s eligibility for
EITC and/or other family status issues at trial while conceding that the
accuracy-related penalty should not apply.157
In other cases, the taxpayer lost on his or her EITC and/or other family
status claims, but the court held that the accuracy-related penalty should not
apply.158 Where the record allowed for it, the Court examined the
taxpayer’s intentions and efforts. For example, in Burton v. Commissioner
the court sympathetically noted that the taxpayer “cared for the children and
provided financial support in a multitude of ways” while failing to meet the
statutory requirements: “The law does not always reward commendable
acts such as petitioner’s.”159 While the court upheld the deficiency, it did
not sustain the imposition of the accuracy-related penalty. It found that
taxpayer satisfied the reasonable cause exception because he “made a
reasonable and good-faith attempt to comply with the technical elements of
law regarding qualifying children and qualifying relatives.”160

157

Manukainiu v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1919, 1998 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 98,090 (1998); Kore v.
Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-109, 2007 WL 1827100 (2007).
158

Burton v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2012-72, 2012 WL 3000339 (2012); Taylor v. Comm’r,
T.C. Summ. Op. 2006-108, 2006 WL 1983166 (2006) (holding that the reasonable cause and good faith
defense applied because petitioner’s EITC and family status claims were “in good faith but based on a
mistaken view of the law”); Edge v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2013-68, 2013 WL 4431270 (2013)
(holding that petitioner acted in good faith because he “is not a tax expert or experienced in tax matters”
and “relied reasonably and in good faith on his commercial preparer”); Payton v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.
Op. 2001-19, 2001 WL 1922058 (2001) (“We find petitioner’s testimony to be credible as to her support
of certain individuals during difficult periods in their lives. Petitioner’s lack of compliance was not
based upon bad faith, but rather on a misunderstanding of the requirements of the dependency
exemption deduction. We also find petitioner credible in her intentions to comply with complex Federal
income tax requirements by seeking out assistance from the Internal Revenue Service.”).
159

Burton, 2012 WL 2000339, at *1.

160

Id. at *4. In support of its finding that the accuracy-related penalty should not apply, the
opinion also noted that petitioner sought help with his return; completed the applicable forms in full; and
that no other taxpayer claimed the children for tax purposes.
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In a number of other cases, the taxpayer lost on the EITC and/or
family-status issues and the court also upheld the imposition of the
accuracy-related penalty due to unfavorable facts in the record and/or the
taxpayers’ failure to present evidence of good faith at trial.161
Reliance on a tax professional can also constitute reasonable cause and
good faith.162 However, tax preparation is expensive and not all taxpayers
choose to use a paid preparer.163 Many low-income individuals self-prepare
using free file, tax software, and/or the help of a well-meaning but equally
unsophisticated friend. As noted in Part I, roughly one-third of taxpayers
claiming EITC do so without the assistance of a paid preparer.164
In a number of recent Tax Court cases, taxpayers have raised the
argument that they relied on Turbo Tax software as a defense to the
imposition of the accuracy-related penalty. With one notable exception, the
so-called “Turbo Tax defense” has been rejected by the Tax Court.165 One
of the cases in which the court rejected the defense, Morales v.
Commissioner,166 involved an erroneously claimed refundable credit. The

161
Neal v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-209, 2007 WL 4355194 (2007); Presley v. Comm’r,
72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1530, 1996 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 96,553 (1996); Chiosie v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH)
1812, 2000 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2000-117 (2000) (finding “there is no persuasive evidence that petitioner
made a reasonable attempt to comply with applicable law”); Jackson v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH)
2022, 1996 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 96,054 (1996) (“Petitioner’s lack of substantiation and the unexplained
inconsistency in his testimony about the child care expenses claimed compel us to find petitioner liable
for the accuracy related penalty.”).
162
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(2) (2003) provides examples illustrating this and other examples.
For an example outside the refundable credit context, see Furnish v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 821,
2001 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2001-286 (2001) (“It is clear from the record that petitioner is an unsophisticated
taxpayer who relied reasonably and in good faith on his accountant. Consequently, we conclude that for
the years in issue petitioner had reasonable cause and acted in good faith as to any underpayment
resulting from the deductions in issue.”).
163
Of electronically filed returns in fiscal year 2012, 63% (75,139,489 of 118,401,243 total
returns) were classified as practitioner filed. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 2012 DATA BOOK, supra note
37, at 9–10 tbl.4.
164

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra note 16.

165

The notable exception is Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2011-131, 2011 WL 5885082
(2011) (finding that taxpayer who made a data entry error acted in good faith and with reasonable cause
because he “reviewed the information he entered using his tax preparation software upon completion of
the software’s interview process. Despite his best efforts, however, petitioner failed to discover that the
amount of the interest income did not appear on the final version of his tax return that was filed.”).
166

Morales v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 741, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-341 (2012).
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taxpayers claimed the FTHBC, resulting in an $8,000 credit, the maximum
available amount. For purposes of the credit, a “first-time homebuyer” was
defined as “any individual if such individual (and if married, such
individual’s spouse) had no present ownership interest in a principal
residence during the 3-year period ending on the date of the purchase of the
principal residence to which this section applies.”167 The taxpayers had sold
a previous residence thirty-four months prior to the purchase of their new
property; as the sale was in the three-year window, the taxpayers were not
eligible for the credit and the court upheld the Service’s denial.168 The court
next considered the Service’s imposition of the accuracy-related penalty for
negligence or disregard of rules or regulations, noting that this was the first
case in which the Service imposed the accuracy-related penalty in the
context of the FTHBC.169 The taxpayers raised the reasonable cause and
good faith defense; they contended that they used Turbo Tax to prepare the
return and the software was “responsible for them improperly claiming the
first-time homebuyer credit.”170 Citing precedent, the court noted that “tax
preparation software is only as good as the information the taxpayer puts
into it” and that “the misuse of tax preparation software, even if
unintentional or accidental, is no defense to penalties under section
6662.”171
The reasonable cause and good faith defense is generally the one
raised to challenge a section 6662 accuracy-related penalty in court.
However, in the refundable credit context, challenges also have been raised
on statutory interpretation grounds.

167

I.R.C. § 36(c)(1).

168

Morales, 104 T.C.M. at *3–*4.

169

Id.

170

Id. at *6.

171

Id. (citing Bunney v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 259, 266–67 (2000); Anyika v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322, 2011 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2011-069 (2011); and Lam v. Comm’r, 99
T.C.M. (CCH) 1346, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-082 (2010)). The Morales decision noted that the
petitioners did not introduce evidence regarding the TurboTax instructions and the information they
entered into the software; the decision remarked in a footnote: “We leave for another day whether
reliance on tax preparation software such as TurboTax is sufficient to avoid the accuracy-related penalty
where the taxpayer has provided evidence demonstrating a programming flaw or an instructional error.”
Morales, 104 T.C.M. at *7 n.2.
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2. Statutory Interpretation: Can a Negative Income Tax Liability
Result in an “Underpayment”?
In three instances interpreting section 6662, the Tax Court has held
that an overstated refundable credit should not be taken into account in the
computation of “understatement”172 or “underpayment.”173 The result in
these cases was that the court found there was no accuracy-related penalty
because an underpayment did not result. The Akhter case drew a distinction
between an overclaim that created a negative tax liability and an overclaim
that merely reduced a precredit income tax liability.174 However, none of
the three cases has precedential value because in each instance the taxpayer
had elected the small case procedures.175
The Service has not adopted this interpretation. The Internal Revenue
Manual provides definitions in its penalty handbook stating that
adjustments to refundable credits are to be included in calculating the
amount of tax imposed and the amount of the underpayment.176 The Office
of Chief Counsel adopted the same position, which it reaffirmed in 2009 in
a memorandum to the service program managers:
Because [Treasury Dept. Reg. § 1.6664-2(b) and (c)(1)] state that the
calculations are to be made “without regard” to the section 31 and 33 credits,
estimated payments and other payments, the “amount of tax imposed” and the
“amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return” should be computed

172

Quintero v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2002-47, 2002 WL 1825321 (2002).

173

Solomon v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-95, 2008 WL 2945344 (2008) (drawing a
distinction between computation of deficiency under I.R.C. § 6211(b)(4) and calculation of
underpayment under § 6664(a), the court held that a refundable fuel tax credit disallowance should be
included in the former but not the latter); Akhter v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2001-20, 2001 WL
1922060, at *3 (2001) (holding that the accuracy-related penalty does not apply because “there can be
no underpayments . . . because for each year in issue the tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code was
zero and did not exceed the amount of tax shown on the return.” As authority, n.3 of the Akhter opinion
states, “Compare the definition of an underpayment in sec. 6664(a) with the definition of a deficiency in
sec. 6211(a). While the definitions are substantially similar, the latter—in contrast to the former—treats
the excess of the earned income credit claimed (or allowed) over the tax shown (or imposed) as a
negative amount of tax. See sec. 6211(b)(4).”). Id.
174
Akhter, 2001 WL 1922060, at *3. See also Zelenak, Welfare, supra note 16, at 1894 n.113
(phrasing the distinction as two different types of overclaims).
175

See I.R.C. § 7463(b).

176

I.R.M. 20.1.5.2.4(8).
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with regard to other refundable credits, such as the FTHBC or EIC, when
determining if there is an underpayment amount.177

The same memorandum further notes that “refundable credits can be
seen as payments or negative tax because these are paid to the taxpayer to
the extent they exceed the taxpayer’s liability for the year.”178 It justifies its
conclusions with the rationale that the accuracy-related penalty “should
apply equally” to those taxpayers claiming credits to which they are not
entitled regardless of whether they report positive taxable income or report
$0 taxable income and $0 tax for the year.179
For more than a decade, Chief Counsel guidance held this position
both in cases in which the claim was denied pre-refund and those in which
it was denied post-refund.180 As the next section will discuss, in 2012 the
Office of Chief Counsel reconsidered its pre-refund (or “frozen refund”)
position; this development may indeed be very significant for low-income
taxpayers.
In the post-refund context, there is a test case currently pending in the
Tax Court, Rand v. Commissioner,181 in which this statutory interpretation
question was briefed. The taxpayers in Rand, which is a regular case not
subject to the small case procedures, claimed the EITC, child tax credit, and
recovery rebate credit. After issuing the refund, the Service audited the
return and determined that the taxpayers were not entitled to the amounts
claimed. The taxpayers argued that section 6662 cannot be imposed on

177
I.R.S. Program Manager Tech. Adv. Mem. 2010-1 (Nov. 20, 2009) at 2 (citing I.R.S. Chief.
Couns. Mem. 200113028 (Mar. 30, 2001)). But see I.R.S. Program Manager Tech. Adv. Mem. 2012-16
(May 30, 2012) as to frozen refundable credits. This is discussed in detail infra in the next section.
178

I.R.S. Program Manager Tech. Adv. Mem. 2010-1, supra note 177, at 19.

179

Id.

180

“[F]or purposes of calculating an underpayment when there is a EITC disallowed, the
underpayment amount should be the same whether the refund was issued or frozen.” I.R.S. Chief Couns.
Mem. 200113028, supra note 177, at 5.
181

Rand v. Comm’r, No. 2633-11 (T.C. filed Feb. 7, 2011). As this article was going to
publication, the Tax Court issued a court-reviewed opinion in Rand; the majority position adopted
Smith’s argument that the refundable credits “reduce the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his
return, but not below zero.” Rand v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. No. 12, 2013 WL 6063566, at *12. At this time
it is not yet known whether the Service will appeal to the Seventh Circuit.
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refundable credit disallowances. Should the taxpayer prevail on this issue,
the appeal would lie in the 7th Circuit.
Carlton Smith filed an amicus brief detailing his interpretation of the
applicable statutes.182 Both the petitioners and Smith agree that the amount
of tax shown on a return cannot be a negative number.183 The petitioners go
further than Smith, arguing that “tax” as used in section 6664(a) should not
be interpreted to include account reductions for credits.184
Smith disagrees. He asserts that a credit can reduce the tax to zero, but
that it cannot reduce the tax to a negative number. In other words, a
refundable credit is potentially comprised of two distinct portions: 1) the
portion offsetting a tax due, and 2) a refundable portion that exceeds the
tax.185 Smith’s position is that the Service cannot impose the accuracyrelated penalty on the refundable portion of a credit.186

182
Brief for Cardozo Tax Clinic, Carlton Smith as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Rand v.
Comm’r, No. 2633-11 (T.C. filed Feb. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Smith Amicus Brief]. Smith, a tax law
scholar, was director of the Cardozo Tax Clinic at the time of filing but has since returned to private
practice.
183
Petitioners’ Answering Brief to Carlton M. Smith’s Amicus Brief, Rand v. Comm’r, No.
2633-11 (T.C. filed Feb. 7, 2011).
184

Smith Amicus Brief, supra note 182, at 5–6.

185

Zelenak refers to these as the portion reducing a positive precredit income tax liability and the
portion in excess of the taxpayer’s precredit income tax liability. Zelenak, Welfare, supra note 16, at
1894 n.113.
186
In coming to this conclusion, Smith relies on the doctrine of in pari materia, arguing that
I.R.C. § 6664(a) should be given the same interpretation as that given to similar phrases in § 6211(a).
Smith Amicus Brief, supra note 182, at 4. Smith believes the applicable precedent is the Martz case,
which held that a credit shall be considered in computing a deficiency under § 6211(a). Martz v.
Comm’r, 77 T.C. 749, 751–53 (1981). Smith notes that § 6211(b)(4), added to the Code in 1988, does
contemplate a negative tax when the amount of the EITC exceeds the tax liability. However, he cautions
that “the point of the amendment . . . was not to make refundable credits for the first time part of the
deficiency calculation,” but to make the refundable portion of the credit subject to the Tax Court’s
deficiency jurisdiction. Smith Amicus Brief, supra note 182, at 16–17. Absent that amendment, the
Service would be able to assess a refundable credit overpayment without the taxpayer having the right to
contest the assessment in Tax Court. Id. at 14. Smith notes that § 6664(a) (defining underpayment) was
enacted in 1989; as this was only one year after the enactment of § 6211(b)(4), Congress could have
chosen to explicitly include “negative amounts of tax” in the 6664 definition of underpayment, but it did
not do so. Id. at 18. Smith interprets this failure to do so as a deliberate omission, with the result being
that the Service lacks the statutory authority to impose the accuracy-related penalty on the refundable
portion of a credit. Id. at 17–20. He also notes that the Treasury Department Regulation under § 6664
“says nothing about [credit overpayment amounts being treated as] negative amounts of [income] tax.”
Id at 20.
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In its answering brief, the Service emphasizes its position that a
taxpayer should be penalized for an improperly claimed refundable credit:
If the Court adopts the interpretation of the section 6664 underpayment
advocated by amicus, a taxpayer could negligently or intentionally claim a
refundable tax credit in any amount (in this case, $7,471) when he is in fact
ineligible for that credit, yet still only be liable for a nominal penalty that is not
tied in any fashion to the amount of the improper credit.187

This call for a penalty (in addition to repayment of the improperly
claimed portion) goes to the heart of Zelenak’s observations about the EITC
as a program with “self-declared eligibility”:188 while other social benefit
programs require an agency determination in advance of payment,
refundable credits are available to anyone who claims them and must be
policed by limited audit enforcement. The stated concern about a taxpayer
who could “intentionally” claim a credit for which he is ineligible is
misplaced hyperbole, as it blatantly disregards section 32(k), which allows
the Service to impose a two-year ban on claiming the EITC when it is
determined that a taxpayer recklessly or intentionally disregarded the EITC
rules.189 A two-year ban for someone who may be otherwise eligible for the
EITC would constitute a “penalty” of several thousand dollars—far from
nominal.
The Service in Rand further argues that an accuracy-related penalty in
such a case is necessary “to properly reflect the tax harm of the wrongfullyclaimed credits.”190 Recall the Service’s policy statement on penalties,
which states that “penalties encourage compliance by: 1) demonstrating the
fairness of the tax system to compliant taxpayers; and 2) increasing the cost
of noncompliance.”191 The “tax harm” argument advanced in Rand seems to
go beyond enhancing voluntary compliance, suggesting rather that the
penalty can or should serve an expressive rationale.

187
Respondent’s Answering Brief to Brief for Amicus Curiae Cardozo Tax Clinic at 5, Rand v.
Comm’r, No. 2633-11 (T.C. filed Feb. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Respondent’s Answering Brief].
188

Zelenak, Welfare, supra note 16, at 1869.

189

I.R.C. § 32(k)(1)(B)(ii). Part III, infra, discusses section 32(k) in detail.

190

Respondent’s Answering Brief, supra note 187, at 8.

191

I.R.M. 1.2.20.1.1.(3).
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In his legal scholarship, Smith wonders why the Service seems to be
ignoring a newer penalty section, enacted in 2007: the section 6676
“erroneous claim for refund or credit” penalty.192 Smith believes the Service
may view section 6676 as “unnecessary because it thinks it can already get
a 20 percent accuracy-related penalty in nearly every income tax case in
which it could get the section 6676 penalty.”193
The Treasury Department has not yet promulgated regulations on
section 6676, but the Office of Chief Counsel has provided its interpretation
as to how the newer penalty intersects with section 6662 in the FTHBC
context.194 The guidance notes that “[t]he key to identifying which of the
penalties applies to a taxpayer erroneously claiming a refund or credit is to
first determine if his reporting creates an underpayment on his return.”195 In
its examples, the Service includes the refundable credits in its calculation of

192

Smith, supra note 154. I.R.C. § 6676 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Civil Penalty.—If a claim for refund or credit with respect to
income tax (other than a claim for a refund or credit relating to the earned
income credit under section 32) is made for an excessive amount, unless it is
shown that the claim for such excessive amount has a reasonable basis, the
person making such claim shall be liable for a penalty in an amount equal to
20 percent of the excessive amount . . .
(b) . . . the term “excessive amount” means . . . the amount by which
the claim for refund or credit for any taxable year exceeds the amount of such
claim allowable . . .
(c) Coordination with Other Penalties.—This section shall not apply to
any portion of the excessive amount of a claim for refund or credit which is
subject to a penalty imposed under part II of subchapter A of chapter 68.

193
Smith, supra note 154, at 973. Smith points to the fact that Congress carved the EITC out from
§ 6676 as support for his statutory interpretation of “underpayment” in § 6664(a), arguing that Congress
“did not want a 20 percent penalty imposed on EITC disallowances—under [§] 6662, 6663, or 6676—
on top of the money that was erroneously paid to the taxpayer and must be reimbursed.” Id. at 978.
Smith continues: “Congress apparently decided that the sanction it imposed at [§] 32(k) on people who
incorrectly claim the EITC is a better sanction than simply adding on a 20 percent penalty against a lowincome taxpayer who is probably unlikely to pay back the improper EITC or any penalty.” Though it is
not clear that Congress was so intentional in its thinking, Part III of the article concludes that [§] 32(k)
should be the sole and appropriate sanction for “those who know better.”
194

Program Manager Tech Adv. Mem. 2011-003 (Aug. 27, 2010). The guidance was
subsequently revisited in Program Manager Tech. Adv. Mem. 2012-16, which revised its examples to
the extent they involved frozen refunds. However, the 2010 guidance presumably would still apply to
non-frozen (post-refund) credits.
195

Program Manager Tech. Adv. Mem. 2011-003 at 2.
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the underpayment. It advises that if an underpayment exists, the examiner
must first determine whether the section 6662 accuracy-related penalty
applies on a theory of negligence or disregard or substantial
understatement. If so, section 6676 cannot apply; if, however, there is no
basis for imposing the section 6662 penalty, the examiner should consider
whether section 6676 may apply.196
Olson has criticized section 6676 as “overbroad” and noted that its
“reasonable basis” exception is not the same as the “reasonable cause”
defense permitted in section 6662. Olson has recommended that Congress
should amend section 6676 to add such a “reasonable cause” defense for
taxpayers who make an inadvertent error when claiming a non-EITC
refundable credit.197 Olson’s concern stems in part from the fact that—
unlike section 6662, which is an addition to tax—section 6676 is an
assessable penalty, meaning a taxpayer does not have recourse in Tax Court
through a deficiency proceeding.198
In the event that the taxpayers prevail in Rand and the Tax Court
agrees that an “underpayment” should not include the refundable portion of
a credit, this will be great precedent for future litigants challenging the
imposition of the penalty, especially in EITC cases. But the average
taxpayer will not know about Rand. Unsophisticated taxpayers will benefit
only if the Service acquiesces and changes its policy at the examination
level or, alternatively, if Congress clarifies the definition by amending the
statute. Meanwhile, however, even if it is determined that a denied
refundable credit does not constitute an “underpayment,” those credits other
than the EITC will remain vulnerable to the imposition of a 20% penalty
under section 6676.

196

Id. at 9–10.

197

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra note 16, at 547. The American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants recently made the same recommendation. THE AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED
PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, TAX PENALTIES LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (2013), available at http://www.aicpa
.org/advocacy/tax/taxlegislationpolicy/downloadabledocuments/aicpa-legislative-proposals-penalties2013.pdf.
198
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra note 16, at 547 (citing I.R.C. § 6671 and
I.R.M. 8.11.1.2). However, a taxpayer would be able to pursue prepayment review of a section 6676
penalty in Tax Court within the context of a collection due process hearing.
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3. Frozen Refundable Credits: Has the Service Ceded Ground in This
Subset of Audits?
To help prevent improper payments, the Service will commonly hold
or “freeze” the EITC portion of a refund, meaning the taxpayer is selected
for audit and the refund is not paid out unless and until the taxpayer
substantiates entitlement for the credit. These are referred to by the Service
as “pre-refund examinations.”199 As noted in Part I, frozen refunds are more
common than not in the EITC context.200 Until recently, the Service took
the position that the accuracy-related penalty applied in the refundable
credit context even when the Service froze the refund. Thus even though
the taxpayer never received the credit at the heart of the deficiency, the
Service nonetheless imposed the 20% accuracy-related penalty.
In 2012, the Chief Counsel’s Office reconsidered its position and
recommended that the Service “treat a FTHBC, EI[T]C or other refundable
credit which has not been refunded or credited to the taxpayer, i.e. a frozen
refund, as an ‘amount not so shown previously assessed (or collected
without assessment)’(variable Y).” The guidance further states:
If the Service has not refunded or allowed a credit to the taxpayer for the
erroneously or fraudulently claimed FTHBC or EI[T]C, absent additional
circumstances, the amount of such credit is added to Y because it is a sum
collected without assessment. For most taxpayers the net result will be that X
and Y cancel each other out and consequently no “underpayment” exists.201

This advice is particularly significant for EITC claims that are
denied.202 However, the guidance notes in its non-EITC examples that
while the application of this formula may not result in an “underpayment”

199

See e.g., I.R.S. Program Manager Tech. Adv. Mem. 2012-16, supra note 177, at 3.

200

A TIGTA study found that 60% of EITC exams are audits that occur by correspondence
before the refund is paid. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT VOL. 2, supra note 97, at 82.
201

I.R.S. Program Manager Tech. Adv. Mem. 2012-16, supra note 177, at 3.

202

The Internal Revenue Manual has been updated in at least one place to reflect this guidance.
See I.R.M. 25.1.14.5. However, the definition of underpayment in the Penalty Handbook section of the
Internal Revenue Manual has not yet been updated at the time of writing, at least not publicly. I.R.M.
20.1.5.2.4(8).
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for section 6662 purposes, “the Service may wish to consider applying the
penalty of 6676 to [a taxpayer who makes] an excessive refund claim.”203
The 2012 Chief Counsel guidance notes the pending Rand case and
distinguishes it as a post-refund case.204 The guidance applies only to frozen
refund cases and is therefore not applicable to Rand and the significant
percentage of claims that are audited after a refund is issued.
While it is interesting to examine the case law on the reasonable cause
defense and the challenges to the definition of “underpayment,” it is
important to keep in mind that most examinations are not resolved by trial.
Many taxpayers concede or do not contest the examination of the
underlying credit or respond to the subsequent Notice of Deficiency, so the
cases do not go to IRS Counsel for trial. Among those unsophisticated
taxpayers who are unrepresented, it is possible that many do not understand
that the accuracy-related penalty has been imposed, let alone know about
the possible defenses. For these reasons, Part III proposes solutions that are
both statutory and administrative-based.
III. A FINE LINE: HOW TO DETER THOSE WHO KNOW BETTER WHILE NOT
UNDULY PENALIZING THOSE WHO DON’T KNOW
To be sure, the availability of refundable credits attracts fraud.205 There
are many documented cases of individuals who clearly “knew better” than
to claim a credit that was subsequently disallowed. The Service should and
does scrutinize claims in order to minimize improper payments. But in
doing so, it should be careful not to unduly penalize those taxpayers who
“don’t know” simply because they do not understand the complexities or
appreciate the nuances of the Code. Congress already has provided the
Service with statutory tools to address both reckless disregard and
fraudulent behavior. By drawing a clearer line between inadvertent error

203

I.R.S. Program Manager Tech. Adv. Mem. 2012-16, supra note 177, at 6.

204

Id. at 9.

205

Olson notes in a research study entitled Running Social Programs Through the Tax Code:
“[T]he data do not necessarily support the position that the refundability component actually attracts or
influences noncompliance more than any other type of tax incentive. The amount of the benefit and the
relative ease with which it can be obtained appear to be more significant factors.” NAT’L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE 2009 REPORT VOL. 2, supra note 78, at 82.
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and intentional wrongdoing, the Service can accomplish the policies
underlying the penalty regime without undermining faith or trust in the
revenue system. This Part will look at existing tools for combating
fraudulent claims, draw comparisons with other social benefit programs,
and propose new solutions for protecting the unsophisticated taxpayers.
A. The Problem of Fraudulent Overclaims: “Those Who Know Better”
TIGTA notes that “the [Service] has found that refundable credits of
significant amounts attract fraud and fraudulent preparers.”206 Schemes are
hatched. Individuals claim children who do not exist. Clearly, these
claimants know that they are not entitled to the benefits, but are looking for
easy money. In the most egregious cases, criminal charges are brought. For
example, a California man was sentenced to 54 months in prison and
ordered to pay restitution to the Service for his participation in a scheme in
which he filed more than 1,000 false returns seeking $1.3 million in EITC
refunds.207 If criminal charges are not warranted, the Service might consider
pursuing civil fraud penalties via section 6663 of the Code, which is a 75%
rather than a 20% penalty.208 The burden of proof is significantly higher for
the Service to prevail on a fraud penalty than on the accuracy-related
penalty.209
Section 32(k)210 provides other tools for the Service to address those
taxpayers who “should know better.” Section 32(k)(1) permits a 2-year

206

TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REF. NO. 2011-40-023, REDUCTION TARGETS
AND STRATEGIES HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED TO REDUCE THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN IMPROPER
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PAYMENTS EACH YEAR 29 (2011).
207

Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Central District of Columbia, Downey Man Who
Participated In Tax Fraud And Identity Theft Scheme Sentenced To 54 Months In Federal Prison
(Mar. 18, 2013) (on file with author). For more examples, see Examples of Identity Theft Schemes—
Fiscal Year 2013, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, available at
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Examples-of-Identity-Theft-Schemes-Fiscal-Year-2013.
208

See, e.g., Hammond v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2011-26, 2011 WL 839765 (2011)
(upholding the 75% penalty under section 6663 where taxpayer claimed two children who did not exist).
209

“The Commissioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the taxpayer
intentionally engaged in wrongdoing with the specific intent to avoid a tax that he knew to be owing.”
Id. at 5, citing Akland v. Comm’r, 767 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’g 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 51.
210
Section 32(k), enacted as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34,
§ 1085(a)(1), 111 Stat. 788 (1997), provides the following addition to the earned income credit section:
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EITC ban if the Service determines that the claim was due to reckless or
intentional disregard of rules and regulations, or a 10-year ban if it is
determined that the claim was due to fraud. The bans track the criteria for
negligence under 6662 (the 2-year ban) and civil fraud under 6663 (the10year ban), though either ban can be imposed in the absence of (or in
addition to) the penalties.211 Unlike the section 6662 accuracy-related
penalty, these bans require the Service to develop a factual record in
support of its action. The Internal Revenue Manual provides detailed
guidance as to how to develop these cases and decide on whether the 2 or
10-year ban might be appropriate. For instance, the Internal Revenue
Manual provides an “if . . . then” chart with non-inclusive examples of
when to impose the 2-year ban.212 The chart includes these examples,
among others:
If this is the first year EITC audit for the taxpayer, then a ban usually
is not imposed for the first year UNLESS the taxpayer establishes

(k) Restrictions on taxpayers who improperly claimed credit in prior
year.
(1) Taxpayers making prior fraudulent or reckless claims.
(A) In general. No credit shall be allowed under this
section for any taxable year in the disallowance period.
(B) Disallowance period. For purposes of paragraph (1),
the disallowance period is—
(i) the period of 10 taxable years after the most
recent taxable year for which there was a final
determination that the taxpayer’s claim of credit under
this section was due to fraud, and
(ii) the period of 2 taxable years after the most
recent taxable year for which there was a final
determination that the taxpayer’s claim of credit under
this section was due to reckless or intentional disregard
of rules and regulations (but not due to fraud).
(2) Taxpayers making improper prior claims. In the case of a
taxpayer who is denied credit under this section for any taxable year as
a result of the deficiency procedures under subchapter B of chapter 63,
no credit shall be allowed under this section for any subsequent
taxable year unless the taxpayer provides such information as the
Secretary may require to demonstrate eligibility for such credit.
211

I.R.M. 20.1.5.2.1.

212

I.R.M. 4.19.14.6.1(7).
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blatant disregard for the rules and regulations. Example: During a
conversation, the taxpayer admits he/she knew they did not meet the
eligibility requirements but decided to “try it anyway.” In this instance,
the ban would be justified because the taxpayer intentionally
disregarded the rules and regulations.
If a decedent’s SSN is used for a qualifying child and the person died
before the year under examination, then based on facts and
circumstances presented apply the two-year ban.
If the technician can determine the taxpayer’s claim was due to
reckless or intentional disregard rather than misunderstanding or
confusion of the rules, then the two-year ban should be imposed.
The taxpayer is claiming different qualifying children each year and,
when asked to identify the qualifying children, the taxpayer does not
know who they are claiming, then the two-year ban should be
imposed.213
Interestingly, all of these examples require the examiner to delve into
the facts surrounding the claim and show bad faith before imposing the
negligence/disregard ban. In these examples, the Service is developing facts
to demonstrate that the taxpayer “knew better.”214 While a 2-year ban is a
harsh outcome for a claimant, such a penalty is arguably warranted if the
taxpayer is acting in bad faith. Importantly, the onus is on the Service to
show the bad faith before imposing a ban. Contrast this to the section 6662
20% accuracy-related penalty, which can be imposed on a taxpayer by a
statutory calculation without any showing of bad faith; in those cases, the
onus is on the taxpayer to prove good faith, but due to automation and other
audit barriers, it is commonly the case that the taxpayer’s story will not be
heard.
Statutory tools exist for the Service to penalize those who know better.
It should use them. It is important, however, to distinguish and protect those
taxpayers who make inadvertent errors. This is particularly true in the

213

Id.

214

The manual also provides detailed guidance on when to impose the 10-year ban, including
examples of fraud indicators in EITC cases. Id. at (8). As noted, development of a 10-year ban case
more closely parallels the § 6663 civil fraud penalty.
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context of refundable credits because these taxpayers are trying to access
social benefits that Congress chose to make available in the Code.
B. Refundable Credits Are Social Benefits and Overpayments Should Be
Addressed Accordingly
Olson has analogized refundable credits to claims for other federal
benefits, stating that for those taxpayers, filing a Form 1040 “is no different
from an advance application for veterans’ benefits or food stamps.”215 So
how do other agencies that distribute social benefits address overclaims?
Like the Service, other agencies are very concerned with identifying
fraudulent overpayments. In some contexts, fraud results in the suspension
of benefits, similar to the 2- and 10-year EITC ban, or even termination in
benefits after repeated offenses. As with refundable credits, fraud can
sometimes result in criminal charges including imprisonment.
More instructive for purposes of this article is the way other agencies
treat inadvertent error. This part will draw comparisons among refundable
credits and two other federal social programs: the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). In
all three contexts, a recipient may be required to repay amounts that were
overpaid due to inadvertent error of the recipient. Hardship exceptions may
apply: the rules vary depending on the type of benefit. But in comparison to
the other two programs, the Internal Revenue Code is far more punitive
with regard to inadvertent error.216
1. SNAP
The program formerly known as food stamps, SNAP is operated by the
states but funded federally and overseen by the United States Department of

215

Olson, Loving, supra note 6. See also Zelenak, Welfare, supra note 16.

216

In comparing the EITC 2- and 10-year sanctions with the civil sanctions imposed for the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and food stamps (now known as SNAP) programs,
Lawrence Zelenak concluded: “The EITC [2- and 10-year ban] sanctions much more closely resemble
sanctions for misbehavior in connection with welfare programs (TANF and Food Stamps) than they
resemble generally applicable income tax penalties.” He noted, however, that the EITC ban sanctions
“have been applied very sparingly” as compared to the welfare civil sanctions. Zelenak, Welfare, supra
note 16, at 1893–96.
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Agriculture (USDA). The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) is charged
with overseeing accuracy, and it monitors the states’ implementation for
quality control.217 Under federal regulation, FNS delegates administration
to the states, including “the authority to determine the amount of, and settle,
adjust, compromise or deny all or party of any claim which results from
fraudulent or nonfraudulent overissuances to participating households.”218
Overissuances are categorized in one of three ways: 1) Intentional Program
Violation (IPV); 2) Inadvertent Household Error (IHE); or 3) Agency Error
(AE).219
An IPV includes a knowledge element; it is defined as when a
recipient has “intentionally made a false or misleading statement, or
misrepresented, concealed or withheld facts.”220 IPVs can result in
disqualification from the program, but the recipient is first entitled to an
investigation, notice, and hearing.221 The intentional wrongdoing must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.222
On the other hand, an IHE is defined as a “claim for an overpayment
resulting from a misunderstanding or unintended error on the part of the
household.”223 After finding an IHE or an AE (an overpayment caused by
the state’s action or failure to take action), the state agency must pursue
repayment but is limited to collecting “the greater of $10 per month or 10
percent of the household’s monthly allotment, unless the household agrees
to a higher amount.”224
To draw the analogy to refundable tax credits, an IPV would be
committed by “those who know better” whereas an IHE would be an
erroneous claim made by an unsophisticated taxpayer. Like fraudulent

217
156 CONG. REC. D864-01, 2010 WL 2943065 (July 28, 2010) (testimony of Julie Paradis,
Administrator, Food and Nutrition Service).
218

7 C.F.R. § 271.4(b) (2013).

219

Id. at § 273.18(b).

220

Id. at § 273.16(c).

221

Id. at § 273.16.

222

Id. at § 273.16(e)(6).

223

Id. at § 273.18(b).

224

Id. at § 273.18(g).
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EITC claims, an IPV can result in program disqualification. A recipient
shown to have committed an IPV is disqualified from the program for 12
months for a first violation, for 24 months for a second violation, and
permanently for a third violation.225
Like inadvertently erroneous refundable credit claims, the agency will
require repayment of an overissuance due to an IHE. It will not, however,
impose any additional penalty for the error.
2. SSI
SSI is the “nation’s largest cash assistance program for the poor.”226
Administered by the Social Security Administration, the SSI program
provides monthly benefits to people with limited income and resources who
are disabled, blind, or age 65 or older.227 Unlike Social Security benefits,
SSI eligibility is not based on work history and is not funded by social
security (FICA and SECA) taxes.228 In 2011, the program paid $46 billion
to 9 million recipients.229
As with EITC eligibility, eligibility for SSI is determined by complex
and changing factors such as income levels and living arrangements.230 As
with the EITC and other social benefit programs, overpayments are a
concern.231 The statute and regulations governing SSI distinguish between

225
Id. at § 273.16(b). Penalties are increased if certain aggravating conditions are present, such as
controlled substances, firearms, or trafficking.
226
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-849, PROGRESS MADE IN DETECTING AND
RECOVERING OVERPAYMENTS, BUT MANAGEMENT ATTENTION SHOULD CONTINUE 1 (2002)
[hereinafter GAO 02-849].
227

SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., NO. 05-11000, SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI) 4 (2012).

228

SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., Understanding Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Overview,
http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-over-ussi.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
229
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-109, SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME:
SSA HAS TAKEN STEPS TO PREVENT AND DETECT OVERPAYMENTS, BUT ADDITIONAL ACTIONS COULD
BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT 8 (2012) [hereinafter GAO 13-109].
230

Id.

231

GAO 02-849, supra note 226, at 4. “Since its inception, the SSI program has been difficult and
costly to administer because even small changes in monthly income, available resources, or living
arrangements can affect benefit amounts and eligibility. . . . SSA must constantly monitor these
situations to ensure benefit amounts are paid accurately.”
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fraudulent and nonfraudulent causes of overpayment. For purposes of an
analogy with the accuracy-related penalty, this discussion will focus solely
on nonfraudulent overpayments.232 Nonfraudulent overpayments occur
when there is a change in circumstance that affects the recipient’s payment
level or eligibility. The recipient may be required to fully repay the
overpayments through adjustment to future benefits, in which case monthly
limitations may apply to the adjustment.233 There are also exceptions in
which the agency will waive repayment of the overpayment;234 in fiscal
year 2011, approximately 76% of the 276,226 SSI overpayment waivers
requested by recipients were approved by SSA.235
To help prevent overpayments from occurring, SSI recipients are
required to report certain events or changes in circumstance affecting
eligibility within 10 calendar days after the end of the month in which the
change occurred.236 If the failure to make a required report in a timely
manner results in an overpayment, a penalty applies.237 According to the
GAO, these penalties “are meant to encourage recipients to file accurate
and timely reports of information so that SSA can adjust its records to
correctly pay benefits.”238 This penalty can be analogized to an accuracy-

232

SSI fraud is determined under a “knowing and willful” standard, can be criminally prosecuted,
and can be punished by imprisonment of up to 5 years. 42 U.S.C. § 1383a(a) (2013). The regulations
provide civil sanctions for making false or misleading statements or withholding information, including
suspension of benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1340 (2013). This regulation includes a “know or should know”
standard, which can be interpreted as more than an inadvertent error but less than fraudulent intent.
Because it involves an affirmative misstatement or material nondisclosure, this could perhaps be
analogized to the reckless disregard grounds for the 2-year EITC ban.
233

20 C.F.R. § 416.571 (2013).

234

42 U.S.C. § 1383(b)(1)(B)(i) (2013); 20 C.F.R. § 416.550 (2013). For example, adjustment or
waiver may be granted upon a finding that the recipient is “without fault [in the receipt of the
overpayment] and adjustment or recovery of the overpayment would defeat the purpose of the
supplemental security income program.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.553 (2013).
235

GAO 13-109, supra note 229, at 14.

236

42 U.S.C. § 1383(e)(2) (2013). See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.708 (2013). The regulations provide a
list of 14 different reportable events or changes. Like the EITC requirements, some of the changes hinge
on factually intensive situations that for some households are fluid. For example, a recipient must report
“any change in the make-up of your household: That is, any person who comes to live in your household
and any person who moves out of your household.” § 416.708(b).
237

42 U.S.C. § 1383(e)(2) (2013). See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.722 (2013).

238

GAO 02-849, supra note 226, at 13.
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related penalty in the sense that recipients may inadvertently fail to report a
change due to a misunderstanding of the rules. However, there are two
important distinctions to note in making this analogy: 1) the dollar amount
of the applicable penalties is far less severe; and 2) as with section 6662,
there is a “good cause” exception for the failure to timely report a change.
With the EITC and other refundable tax credits, the accuracy-related
penalty is 20% of the underpayment of tax.239 Because of the large dollar
amounts at stake with these refundable credits, the dollar amount of the
penalty will exceed $1,000 in many cases. In contrast with this figure, the
penalty for failure to timely report events or changes in circumstances
affecting SSI eligibility is stunningly modest: $25 for the first penalty
period; $50 in the second penalty period; and $100 for the third and any
following penalty period.240
The statute and regulations further provide that there will be no penalty
deduction from SSI if the agency finds the recipient had “good cause for
failure to report timely.”241 “Good cause” includes a finding that the
recipient is “without fault” or that the failure or delay in reporting was “not
willful.”242 The regulations provide: “In determining whether you have
good cause for failure to report timely, we will take into account any
physical, mental, educational, or linguistic limitations (including any lack
of facility with the English language) you may have.”243
Drawing analogies between the Code’s treatment of inadvertent error
and the ways in which other programs and agencies treat error is
enlightening. Important distinctions persist, and the comparison should not
be overstated. While the EITC is a safety net designed to help lift working
persons out of poverty, SSI and SNAP are designed as a safety net for basic
subsistence. Thus, it is quite arguably more appropriate for the agencies
administering those benefits to error on the side of leniency.

239

I.R.C. § 6662(a).

240

20 C.F.R. § 416.724 (2013).

241

Id. at § 416.732.

242

Id. at § 416.732(a).

243

Id. at § 416.732(b).
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Another obvious distinction is the method of obtaining the social
benefits. As discussed in section A of Part I, taxpayers claiming a
refundable credit self-declare their eligibility, whereas other forms of social
benefits are distributed only after a more thorough application and
evaluation process.244 Though the costs of administering the EITC are very
low relative to other social programs, the trade-off of this low
administrative cost appears to be a higher overpayment rate for EITC.245
With this shift in costs and benefits comes another trade-off: taxpayers
are left to figure out eligibility on their own. They do not benefit from
government workers reviewing their documents, asking questions, and
determining eligibility in advance of the determination. If Nina Olson is
correct in her observation that “Congress views refundable tax credits as a
favored means of delivering social benefits and implementing policy,”246
then these taxpayers should not be penalized for making an innocent and
inadvertent error. They should not be penalized with an addition to tax
simply because they did not understand correctly how a complex and
lengthy statutory rule applied to their situation. Just as other agencies do not
issue punitive sanctions for overpayments absent a finding of fraudulent
behavior, the Service should reconsider the role of section 6662 in
refundable credits.
With this goal in mind, the final section examines a variety of
solutions, both administrative and legislative.
C. Solutions
The analogies drawn in section B of this Part show that the Service is
more punitive than other agencies in its imposition of penalties on
taxpayers who make inadvertent errors. Regardless of the design
differences in the delivery of benefits, recipients should not be penalized for
mistakenly claiming social benefits. In the current system, the penalty is

244

See supra text accompanying notes 27–33.

245

See supra text accompanying notes 32–33.

246

NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2009 REPORT VOL. 2, supra note 78, at 78 (Olson cites “The
passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 (ARRA) and the Worker,
Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 (WHBA)” in support of her observation.). See
also supra note 66 (these bills amended and expanded the FTHBC).
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often imposed in an automated fashion because it is prompted statutorily by
the dollar figure of the erroneous credit.
The penalty would function more appropriately as a deterrent if it were
imposed more thoughtfully. A more thoughtful process would better
demonstrate the fairness of the system, consistent with the Service’s policy
statement on penalties.247 Ideally, the Service would delve into the
taxpayer’s motives and carefully weigh the circumstances in deciding
whether to impose a penalty. One positive change would be for the Service
to interpret section 6664(c) in a more taxpayer-friendly manner, such as
presuming that a taxpayer acted in good faith unless the Service can show
factors indicating otherwise.
By no means intended as an exhaustive list of solutions, this section
will consider a few alternative ways in which the Service or Congress might
reexamine the treatment of inadvertent errors.
1. Exclude Refundable Credits from the Calculation of Underpayments
One alternative is for the Service to disregard refundable credits when
calculating the amount of tax imposed and the amount of the underpayment.
This would be consistent with its recent legal advice on frozen refunds and
with the taxpayers’ primary position in the Rand litigation. If the Service
adopted this interpretation, an improperly claimed refundable credit
(whether inadvertently or intentionally claimed) would no longer result in
an “underpayment”; the effect of this would be that the refundable credit
portion is excluded from the calculation of any section 6662 penalty. This
would be true for both the negligence or reckless disregard basis and the
substantial understatement of income tax basis.
If this approach were adopted, there are two things to keep in mind.
First, the Service would still be able to sanction improper EITC claims by
use of the section 32(k) 2- and 10-year bans. These are important tools and
are necessary to penalize those who “know better” but choose to engage in
fraud. Ideally, the Service would be vigilant in developing the facts before
imposing an EITC ban and would not do so unless the evidence clearly

247

See supra text accompanying note 119.
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indicated that the taxpayer knew he or she was not eligible but claimed it
anyway.
The second thing to keep in mind is that refundable credits other than
the EITC would be subject to the section 6676 “erroneous claim for refund
or credit” penalty. However, section 6676 poses a different challenge and
could be a trap for the unwary. The statute provides that a 20% penalty is
imposed on the excess amount of the credit “unless it is shown that the
claim for such excessive amount has a reasonable basis.”248 The Treasury
Department has not promulgated regulations under section 6676, though the
Service has issued internal guidance.249 The Internal Revenue Manual states
that for purposes of section 6676, the definition of reasonable basis is
provided in Treasury Department Regulation 1.6662-3(b)(3).250 Without the
benefit of further guidance from the Service, it is difficult to know how this
standard would be applied. Though section 6676 imports this definition
from a regulation issued under section 6662’s accuracy-related penalty, the
“reasonable basis” concept is distinct from “reasonable cause.” Reasonable
basis relates to a standard of tax reporting for return positions and does not,
on its face, provide a good faith exception.251
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I.R.C. § 6676(a).
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See, e.g., Interim Guidance Memo SB/SE 20-0111-00 (Dec. 30, 2010); I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 200747020 (Nov. 23, 2007).
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I.R.M. 20.1.5.16.2(13).
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Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2013) provides:
Reasonable basis is a relatively high standard of tax reporting, that is,
significantly higher than not frivolous or not patently improper. The
reasonable basis standard is not satisfied by a return position that is merely
arguable or that is merely a colorable claim. If a return position is reasonably
based on one or more of the authorities set forth in § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii)
(taking into account the relevance and persuasiveness of the authorities, and
subsequent developments), the return position will generally satisfy the
reasonable basis standard even though it may not satisfy the substantial
authority standard as defined in § 1.6662-4(d)(2). (See § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii)
for rules with respect to relevance, persuasiveness, subsequent developments,
and use of a well-reasoned construction of an applicable statutory provision
for purposes of the substantial understatement penalty.) In addition, the
reasonable cause and good faith exception in § 1.6664-4 may provide relief
from the penalty for negligence or disregard of rules or regulations, even if a
return position does not satisfy the reasonable basis standard.
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It seems that for all refundable credits the Service is relying on section
6662 to impose the accuracy-related penalty because it can do so under its
current definition of underpayment. If the Service were to adopt this
recommendation and exclude refundable credits from the calculation of an
underpayment, it should consider carefully whether it is appropriate to
impose section 6676 in cases of inadvertent error.
Until the Service issues guidance on section 6676 or Congress clarifies
by statute, there is no indication that the Service would refrain from
imposing the 20% penalty even if a taxpayer could show good faith. As
noted previously, Olson has recommended that Congress amend section
6676 to include a reasonable cause and good faith exception.252 In the
absence of such a process to distinguish the taxpayer’s motivation, a
penalty is too punitive and this solution falls short of addressing the
concerns of this article.
2. Increase or Modify the Statutory Computational Threshold for a
“Substantial Understatement”
An alternative and simple legislative solution would be for Congress to
increase or modify the statutory computational threshold for a “substantial
understatement.” As noted in Part II, currently an understatement is
“substantial” if it exceeds the greater of 10% of the tax required to be
shown on the return or $5,000.253 If Congress were to increase this latter
figure to $10,000, that threshold would be sufficiently high so as not to
capture refundable credit overclaims. This would effectively eliminate one
basis for imposition of section 6662. The Service still would be able to
pursue the accuracy-related penalty on the basis of “negligence or disregard
of rules or regulations.”254 Increasing the statutory threshold figure has
advantages and disadvantages.

252
See supra text accompanying notes 197–98. In making this legislative recommendation, Olson
argued that “allowing a taxpayer to present reasonable cause for an error would be consistent with the
purpose of refundable credits, which generally are economic incentives, designed to encourage certain
behaviors, and structured as special tax breaks.” NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 REPORT, supra
note 16, at 547.
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I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1). See supra text accompanying note 140.

254
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The major advantage is that removing the statutory computational
threshold would remove a trap for the unwary. The statutory computation is
black and white: a taxpayer’s claim exceeds it or it does not, leaving no
room for nuance or explanation. If this solution were adopted, the Service
should closely and thoughtfully follow its internal procedures for
considering the penalty under the negligence basis. The Internal Revenue
Manual lists audit indicators for imposing a section 6662 penalty based on
negligence. Some of these include: a history of noncompliance; similar,
prior audits results; overstated deductions or credits, including claiming
clearly improper or exaggerated amounts that are unsubstantiated by facts
or documentation; and failure to explain items questioned by the Service.255
Before increasing the threshold, careful consideration should be given
to the entire world of audits and not just to those taxpayers erroneously
claiming refundable credits. For example, the computational threshold
catches many taxpayers who underreport income or fail to report a specific
item of income. Would there be unintended disadvantages to increasing the
threshold to $10,000, or could these underreporter cases be effectively
addressed using the negligence basis for the penalty?
A related but alternative solution would be to retain the $5,000
threshold figure, but bifurcate the calculation as to refundable credits. This
could be done by applying a different threshold to refundable credits or by
excluding refundable credit overclaims from the threshold calculation.
As with excluding refundable credits from the calculation of
“underpayment,” raising or modifying the statutory threshold for
“substantial understatement” will protect well-meaning EITC claimants, but
carries a risk that the Service may end up falling back on section 6676 to
penalize all other types of erroneously-claimed refundable credits. Thus,
this solution does not fully address the article’s concerns unless there is also
a legislative fix to section 6676.
3. Presumptive First-Time Abatement of the Penalty
A third alternative solution is for the Service to continue to impose the
accuracy-related penalty on erroneous claims as it has been doing, but to
create a process for a presumptive first-time abatement. This is one way to

255

I.R.M. 4.10.6.2.1.
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shift the burden of showing good faith: if presumptive, it would require the
Service to document reasons for not granting the abatement. Given the
sophistication levels of most taxpayers, this is an appropriate burden shift
and addresses the concerns stated herein without removing the Service’s
ability to impose the penalty (or EITC ban) upon a showing of bad faith or
fraud.
The presumptive element would correct what this article identifies as
the major flaw in the current accuracy-related penalty structure, which is
that that relief is actually available, but the very grounds that make one
qualify (lack of sophistication) are the same that would prevent one from
being aware of its availability.
The idea for a first-time abatement for the accuracy-related penalty
arises from an existing Service administrative waiver that is very taxpayer
friendly, yet little known and thus infrequently requested: the first-time
abatement (FTA) penalty waiver for the failure-to-file (FTF), failure-to-pay
(FTP), or failure-to-deposit (FTD) penalty.256 The FTA is a discretionary
administrative waiver by which the Service can grant relief to taxpayers
who receive these automated penalties but have a compliant tax history for
the prior three years.257 The FTA waiver applies only to a single tax year.258
It is not available for the accuracy-related penalty. Noting that “[t]axpayers
are not considered for FTF or FTP penalty relief under FTA criteria unless
they request their penalties be abated,” TIGTA recently criticized the
Service for not publicizing to taxpayers the availability of or opportunity to
request the FTA waiver.259 TIGTA recommended that the Service should
“better use the FTA waiver as a compliance tool by ensuring taxpayers are
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I.R.M. 20.1.1.3.6.1.
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Id. at (5).
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Id. at (3).
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REF. NO. 2012-40-113, PENALTY ABATEMENT
PROCEDURES SHOULD BE APPLIED CONSISTENTLY TO ALL TAXPAYERS AND SHOULD ENCOURAGE
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 3 (2012). The report examined tax year 2010 figures of these penalties:
“From a statistically valid sample of 500 of these accounts—250 assessed FTF penalties and 250
assessed FTP penalties—we found 225 (90 percent) and 231 (92 percent) of the taxpayers qualified for
penalty relief under FTA criteria but were not granted waivers.”
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aware of their potential to receive an FTA waiver based on their past
compliance history.”260
Along similar lines as TIGTA, the Taxpayer Advocate has
recommended that the Service make the FTA waiver automatic, so that it
would be waived without requiring taxpayers to request it.261 In making this
recommendation, Olson suggested “[b]y waiving penalties before
assessment and following up with a ‘soft notice’ that explains the reason for
the waiver, the Service can reduce the cost of administering [reasonable
cause] related penalty requests, while educating taxpayers and encouraging
voluntary compliance.”262
This proposed solution follows a similar logic. A first-time abatement
should be just that—it should be available one time only—but it can serve
important expressive goals. Rather than being punitive, it would serve to
put the taxpayer on notice about the inaccuracy. It would educate the
unsophisticated taxpayer about the way in which he or she misapplied the
tax law on the return, or would help the taxpayer to understand the types of
substantiation that are required so that he or she can keep better records in
future tax years.
If the Service adopted this solution, it could set particular guidelines
for which actions constitute presumptive “good faith” on the part of a
taxpayer. For example, the Service could presumptively abate the penalty in
any case in which the taxpayer responded to the audit with any responsive
documentation, even if the documentation is not deemed sufficient to prove
eligibility. As discussed in Part I, many audits are decided against the
taxpayer because of lack of sufficient documentation.263 This only means
that the Service was not satisfied; it does not mean that the taxpayer was not
eligible for the credit. Responding to an audit with documentation is itself
an act of good faith and should be recognized as such. Taxpayers who know
that they incorrectly claimed credits and get caught doing so would be
unlikely to respond to the audit with any documentation. Recall that the
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Id. at 4.
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NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2010 REPORT, supra note 31, at 202.
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Id. at 203.

263

See supra discussion, at notes 101 & 115.
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majority of taxpayers do not respond to a correspondence audit.264 If the
audit correspondence described the availability of a first-time penalty
abatement for taxpayers who submit responsive documentation, this might
incentivize a greater response rate.
4. Reduce Complexity to Increase Accuracy
This article criticizes complexity as a fundamental cause of inadvertent
overclaims. It argues that if it were easier for taxpayers to understand and
apply the law, there would be fewer inadvertent errors. This can be
addressed through a reduction in complexity, or a simplification of the
Code.
Identifying complexity as “[t]he most serious problem facing
taxpayers—and the [Service],” Nina Olson has made numerous
recommendations for simplifying the Code, including specifically the
family status provisions.265 She notes that “the tax code’s family status
provisions continue to ensnare taxpayers and make tax administration
difficult simply because of the number of such provisions and their
structural interaction.”266 Olson’s proposed solution is for Congress to
consolidate the existing family status provisions into two refundable
credits: a “Family Credit” and a “Worker Credit.”267 Olson’s idea to
bifurcate the credits into two separate functions could help to reduce
complexity, but one should note that the Code provisions are complex
precisely because Congress intended to cast a wide net of eligibility and
support. If the eligibility rules were oversimplified without careful
consideration, the EITC might not reach some of these taxpayers who
Congress intends to assist.
Though a desirable goal, simplification should not be an end in itself.
Rather, it should be undertaken with specific policy goals in mind. For
example, simplified rules might be strategically crafted in an effort to
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See supra text accompanying note 95.
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NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. See also NAT’L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE 2008 REPORT, supra note 122, at 363–69, and NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2005 REPORT,
supra note 153, at 397–406.
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NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
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reduce noncompliance. In the EITC context, Leslie Book has identified
certain structural situations in which he has determined that taxpayers are
likely to claim the credit even though they know they are not entitled to do
so. He argued that taxpayers in these certain situations become frustrated
with the eligibility rules, which can result in “intentional non-compliance
that taxpayers commit to address perceived injustices in the system.”268
Based on these observations, Book made several interesting policy
recommendations that he believed would reduce the “systemic temptations
to cheat.”269 He noted that a consolidation of the Code’s family status
provisions into one unified refundable credit “might also limit the
opportunity or lessen the motive for individuals to game the system.”270 To
the extent that changing the Code can reduce the rate of intentional errors, it
may also make it easier for the Service to sort out a taxpayer’s motivations
and respond appropriately.
While simplification is an attractive solution to a problem created by
complexity, it is perhaps the least realistic alternative because it would
require Congress to accomplish comprehensive and thoughtful tax reform.
IV. CONCLUSION
To the extent penalties are intended to deter erroneous claims, this
intention presumes that the taxpayer understands that he or she is making
the error. Thus, the existence of an accuracy-related penalty will not in
itself deter an inadvertent error. Rather than imposing ex post punitive
measures, it makes more sense to influence taxpayer behavior by investing
resources ex ante in pre-filing education, pre-certification, and/or pre-filing
assistance.
Penalties are also intended to show compliant taxpayers that the
Service does not tolerate improper claims. However, there are a number of
provisions already in place to show that. First, a taxpayer claiming EITC is
twice as likely to face audit as other individual taxpayers. This signals to all
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Leslie Book, Freakonomics and the Tax Gap: An Applied Perspective, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
1163, 1176 (2007).
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taxpayers that these claims are carefully scrutinized. Second, when a claim
is paid and subsequently disallowed on audit, the government assesses a
deficiency that must be repaid to the government, with applicable interest
charged. This signals that for those who are caught, there is no economic
benefit to an improper claim, even if the error was inadvertent. Third, the
Code has civil and criminal fraud provisions to penalize those who claim
credits to which they know they are not entitled. The Service should
enforce these existing provisions, but do so on a carefully documented
record rather than on an automated or reflexive basis.
Most compliant taxpayers sympathize with the notion that taxes are
complex and people make mistakes. A system that is overly punitive
towards mistakes can undermine rather than assure the public’s confidence.
The audit process is already highly automated. The Service should not
allow its penalty process to follow suit. Unsophisticated taxpayers are being
penalized for Congress’s decision to administer social benefits at a low
cost. This is not a sound policy choice. A better choice is to meaningfully
penalize those who knowingly abuse the system while giving well-meaning
taxpayers the benefit of the doubt absent evidence of bad faith.
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